

without further payment, substituting Lee Enfields. There was not a dollar of waste. Likewise with respect to equipment. The War Office desired, so far as possible, uniformity of equipment British and Canadian. The Canadian equipment differed from the British. The desired uniformity could not be attained until a comparatively late stage of the war. Until it was achieved the Canadian troops, while production was being enhanced in England and Canada and the necessary arrangements were being made, were, perforce, equipped with the Canadian equipment. When uniformity was brought about by the substitution of the British equipment for the Canadian (a substitution that implied convenience and not inferiority) it was produced at the expense of the British Government and cost Canada nothing. So neither was there any waste here. My object is not to deny that there was any waste in the course of the conduct of the war. Of course there was. It is simply impossible to conduct a war without, at times, colossal waste. I have no doubt that ^{on} many occasions when our government was driven by necessity into hasty decision our decisions were wrong and results ensued from them that unavailable opportunity for mature deliberation would have prevented. Then, too, in war, the power to expend monies is necessarily delegated to a very large extent to military commanders and others, whose operations are far from the seat of government. This tends to wasteful expenditure, but it is largely unavoidable. So I say, of course there was waste. My immediate purpose is rather to show that Sir Arthur Currie has invaded an unfamiliar field and that his utterances in that field have no weight. I now refer to his statement that one hundred thousand men were sent overseas who were of no use to the army. It is an exaggeration. It is of the class of statements that cannot be true. Some 418,000 men went overseas. The killed, dead of wounds, dead of disease and presumed dead aggregated 56,000. Some 155,000 were wounded and some 3000 were taken prisoners. The utmost in France at any time would be under 300,000. Of these in England many would be casualties from the front. For 100,000 to be of no use one man in four of all those sent over must have been of no use. When forty or fifty thousand dead had been subtracted from the total sent over, then, for anything like 100,000 to be useless the whole force in England must be useless, including