

5. It is estimated, based on the limited information now available, that personnel in the following numbers will be required to meet the most recent request:

(a) Signals — about 200 officers and men.

(b) Logistic depots for four brigades (if required) — 399 officers and men.

(c) Canadian command, liaison and administration — 18 officers and men. If logistic depots are NOT provided, the administrative section would need to be increased to include certain individuals who are now included in the logistic depots in (b) above. (e.g. medical officers, paymaster, cooks, etc.).

6. The Canadian Army is now preparing personnel to meet these requirements. However, some of the personnel selected to meet the original request may not be suitable for the new role, and in consequence additional and different individuals may have to be selected and prepared. The Canadian Army can provide the number of signallers to meet the present request. All the necessary equipment can NOT, however, be provided from Canadian stocks.

7. All indications are that the United Nations operation in the Congo is proceeding as well as can be expected under the circumstances. Under an agreed programme, the Belgian military forces are being withdrawn as quickly as United Nations troops can be deployed for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting property and lives. When the United Nations Force moves in, it disarms the Force Publique of the Congo and assumes its security role. The process of re-organizing the Force Publique is a priority part of the United Nations administrative assistance but the United Nations programme calls for this re-organization after the Belgian troops have been withdrawn and the United Nations Force is firmly established to maintain order. There is every indication that the United Nations is tackling with despatch and efficiency the many difficult problems facing the Organization in the Congo. Every effort is being made to resolve political problems, like the one in Katanga Province, through negotiation and agreement.

8. As for conditions in the Congo, there appears to be no anti-white sentiment among the Congolese but only anti-Belgian. General Alexander foresaw no danger to white personnel serving with the United Nations, so that non-combatant Canadian support troops need to be supplied with personal weapons only.

9. Notwithstanding its early successes on the ground, the United Nations Force is faced with formidable problems of administration and communications. Many of the smaller members of the United Nations do not have the experience necessary for giving adequate administrative support to a mixed force. The language problem in the Congo also poses a difficulty. Canada is admirably suited to provide the assistance contemplated in the Secretary-General's request. Now that the Force contains non-African elements, as well as a large African combat component, there is no political objection to adding white personnel to the Force, even those from NATO countries.

Recommendation

10. It is therefore recommended as a matter of urgency that Canada provide the necessary military forces, including equipment, made up as follows:

(a) A signal detachment at headquarters UNOC in Leopoldville, including a signals office, message centre, 100-line switchboard, linemen and despatch riders.

(b) Five ground to air communication links.

(c) Twelve mobile wireless detachments.

(d) Eight cypher detachments.

(e) Organization and supervisory personnel for four composite logistic depots, one for each brigade, if required.