

favoured accomodation of India and participated in the redefinition of the Commonwealth relationship that was essential to secure that objective. The constitutional issues were considered carefully in Ottawa as in London, though in both capitals policy-makers were at least as concerned with the political and strategic implications of the decision for the Commonwealth and the western alliance (Documents 772 to 821). The evaluation in Ottawa of the significance of India, as a vital link to Asia and a possible bulwark of sympathetic policies in that region, contributed as well to the contemplation of concessions on immigration from India (Documents 754 and 755) and to the importance assigned to the visit to Ottawa of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (Documents 858 to 865). Although no equivalent gesture was made to the Republic of Ireland in time to affect its relationship with the rest of the Commonwealth, Canada and the other members did contrive to maintain preferential treatment of Irish citizens and goods (Documents 831 to 843). In other respects, however, Canada's relationship with the Commonwealth followed familiar lines, particularly with an expressed aversion to definite commitments to Commonwealth consultation as well as to public indications of the differences between it and other members (Documents 766 to 771).

As in the past, Canada's bilateral relations with Commonwealth countries other than the United Kingdom were conspicuously less important than the attention to that multilateral association would imply. Moreover, the Anglo-Canadian agenda was dominated by questions of finance and trade, which were inextricably linked to Canada's other principal bilateral relationship, that with the United States. The inter-dependence of the North Atlantic Triangle in this realm was underlined by the tri-partite talks in Washington involving the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Finance (Documents 593 and 594), as well as by the crises which preceded and the devaluations which followed those meetings. Neither the elusive prospect of Canadian-American free trade nor the eventual advantages of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade nor even the implications of the North Atlantic Treaty for European integration and trans-Atlantic trade could distract Canadian policy-makers from the more immediate benefits of off-shore purchases under the Marshall Plan and the necessity for a fundamental understanding between the sterling and dollar economies. The differences in outlook and consequent tensions between Britain and Canada in matters of finance and trade became even more acute near the end of the year (Documents 633 to 651), but the more typical response in Ottawa was reluctant acknowledgement, often acceptance, that the two partners were drifting apart.

Of course, a contrary trend had been evident for many years in Canadian-American relations, one that was reinforced by developments in Canada's post-war economy and by the pervasive influence of the Cold War. The reasons why Canada should align itself with its southern neighbour in the global confrontation were as myriad as the inter-connections between the two countries. St. Laurent's visit to Washington in February simply confirmed the obvious importance of continental co-operation, while the varied agenda for his talk with President Harry Truman gave only a hint of the range of questions which arose regularly. One perennial topic was the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, for which the American administration was unable to dredge a passage through Congress. With hindsight