

been over-emphasized because I think what is happening inside China today is, even more, a very real debate over policies among different groups of dedicated communists. At stake is nothing less than the future course of the Chinese revolution, in other words the future policies, both domestic and foreign—especially domestic, that the Chinese governments will follow in the years and decades ahead.

Part of the confusion that we all labour under these days relates to the fact that the sources of information are not always the best and that there have been a lot of changes and shifts in the personnel on different sides of the so-called great cultural revolution. I think the issues, which I would like to concentrate on rather than the personalities, have been fairly constant and are now fairly easily identifiable. It is my belief that the great cultural revolution was inspired by Mao Tse-tung and that he has been throughout, and probably still is, the directing force. At any rate even if, to some extent, he is being used by people around him, the aims of the great cultural revolution are easily identifiable with everything for which Mao Tse-tung has stood for at least 40 years, and the tactics that have been used very much bear the imprint of what he has been doing in China for more than 40 years.

I think Mao's basic fear and the basic motivation for launching what is really a revolution inside his own revolution relates to his fear that his original communist revolution will be betrayed and that communism will, in the long run, be undermined in China. Specifically, he fears several groups of people. He fears, as he has always done, the bureaucrats—party and government officials mainly. He feels that they are becoming, and will become more so unless checked, self-seeking, complaisant and even corrupt and that they will emulate, in other words, the scholar-class of old under previous Chinese dynasties which have developed, inevitably, those tendencies. He fears a related class of people, the intellectuals and the technocrats. By "technocrats" I mean a class that is just starting to appear in China—young scientists and engineers and administrative people within the government apparatus. He fears that they are already starting to demand and, in future, unless checked, will demand more vociferously special privileges and prerogatives; that they will, unless checked, become a privileged élite that goes against the communist ideology of Mao Tse-tung and also to Mao, the student of Chinese history, which again recalls the scholar class of old which was a privileged élite and which lost touch with the people. He fears, as he has always done, the peasants of China—at least 550 million of them. Although he based his revolution on the peasantry, he never has had any illusions about the nature of the Chinese peasant. From early on he was talking about what he called the tendencies to capitalism on the part of the peasant. As you may know, private plots were returned to the peasants in the 1959-60 period as a partial concession, a partial withdrawal from the extreme communism of the great-leap-forward period. Mao has obviously never been happy with this sort of concession. Anybody who has been to China today, anybody who has been to any commune, even the communes they show you as the favourite ones, can tell you that the private plots are tended with a tremendous amount of dedication by the peasants. This is obvious to any foreign visitor. To Mao these are the seeds of corruption. This is a return to the anti-communist, capitalistic tendencies that he fears and, unless checked and disciplined, he fears the peasant will go on in this vein.