

to lay down a clear-cut mandate. There will be other kinds of situation where the degree of consensus existing in the Council is so fragile that nothing can be agreed other than a general instruction to prevent conflict or to supervise a truce.

It may be that it will be clearly preferable for the UN to intervene in these circumstances than for some other organization or government to do so without reference to the UN. We may have to accept that the Force Commander and the Secretary-General will have little guidance. However, we should only come to this conclusion, I believe, after having accepted the risk that inadequate terms of reference might do serious harm to the prestige of the UN and to its future effectiveness. There will be no easy answers. But the Canadian Government will be bound to give more searching examination to requests for assistance if it is not satisfied that the mandate provides sufficient guidance for the conduct of the troops on the ground.

There is a related point. Even if defined satisfactorily at the beginning of an operation, the mandate may be subject to interpretation or gradual erosion. Freedom of movement, for example, is particularly important for the carrying out of any mission which involves observation of frontiers or the supervision of a return to normal conditions. Generally, it will be in the interest of the parties that such movement be as unrestricted as possible. But there will also be occasions when this is not so. It is now an accepted condition of peace keeping that the host government consent to the operations and procedures followed by the UN. Nor in principle must the UN interfere in the internal affairs of the host state. But it must be able to observe, to verify and where necessary to interpose. It will be the more difficult to carry out this task if there is not firm, consistent pressure on the parties to co-operate. Who is to exercise this pressure? It is unfair to expect the Secretary-General to do the job alone. The Security Council must give him the backing he needs. If it cannot do so, then contributors may have no choice but to re-examine their decision to participate in the operation.

A third important conclusion we would draw from our experience is that peace keeping is a beginning, not an end. Perhaps the day will come when the UN is able to provide for forces and to maintain bases around the world on a semi-permanent basis. But that day has not yet arrived. In the meantime, contributions by governments of contingents of their forces for UN peace-keeping purposes will be based on the assumption that the parties to the dispute will get on with the job of settling their differences or re-establishing order. The UN cannot, and must not, be responsible for one party clearly gaining the advantage over the other. As a general rule, peace keeping and mediation should proceed concurrently. The Security Council resolution which authorized the Cyprus Force, for example, also provided for the appointment of a mediator. His report was not acceptable to all the parties to the dispute. But, if the latter do not soon find a solution by their own means, then the process of mediation must begin again.