

UNMOVIC innovations

Amorim's recommendations included employing all UNMOVIC staff, including inspectors, as UN civil servants, rather than accepting staff on secondment and in the pay of governments. All staff members would henceforth be obliged to act on behalf of and in the interests of the world organization. In part this was an attempt to avoid the possibility of national intelligence agents, still beholden to their national authorities, being planted in inspection teams. This aim was reinforced by Executive Charman Hans Blix's determination that the flow of intelligence information would be strictly 'one-way traffic'—from national intelligence services to UNMOVIC.⁴⁸ In addition the post of deputy executive chairman was abolished, since 'it had always been a direct channel to the authorities in Washington'.⁴⁹ Internally, intelligence information would be restricted to the executive chairman and a 'special officer', an intelligence conduit trusted by supplier governments. If intelligence information was needed for identifying the target or facilitating the conduct of an OSI, the head of operations and the team leader would also be included in the intelligence 'loop', as agreed with the intelligence provider.

Another UNMOVIC innovation was to establish multi-disciplinary analytical and inspection teams to avoid the 'stove-piping' of information into the three types of WMD that, in the past, had resulted in missed leads and lost opportunities. Training courses were devised to emphasize the need for cross-disciplinary thinking.

A key difference between UNMOVIC and its predecessor was that it was able to use the three-year waiting period to determine priority sites for inspection, carefully analyze the huge amounts of information on Iraq's WMD programmes and capabilities that UNSCOM had collected, consolidate and learn from the experiences of the Special Commission, create a well-trained force of inspectors and refine its monitoring and inspection methods. As instructed in resolution 1284, UNMOVIC focused on identifying 'unresolved disarmament issues' and 'key remaining disarmament tasks'. It assembled the unresolved issues into interrelated clusters to paint a better overall picture of Iraq's WMD programmes and to assess the significance of gaps in its knowledge and hence what still needed to be verified.⁵⁰

Staff training—under UNSCOM largely the responsibility of member states—was now organized and conducted solely by UNMOVIC (with some support from governments).⁵¹ As UNSCOM had been accused of cultural insensitivity, the programme included an Iraqi cultural training package that covered the history, economy and politics of Iraq, as well as regional, social and religious themes. With the completion of the first training courses and the recruitment of 42 professional core staff members in New York, UNMOVIC was in a good position by the end of 2002 to commence inspections at short notice. Courses were still running in February 2003, when UNMOVIC was withdrawn from Iraq, bringing the total number of experts on the UNMOVIC roster to 380 from 55

⁴⁸ Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq: the Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Bloomsbury, London, 2004, p. 50.

⁴⁹ Blix, p. 49.

⁵⁰ 'Unresolved disarmament issues—Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes', UNMOVIC working document, 6 March 2003, presented informally to the Security Council. Paradoxically, a draft work programme was submitted to the Council for its approval on the very day that UNMOVIC completed its last inspection before leaving Iraq ('Draft work programme', UNMOVIC document, 17 March 2003).

⁵¹ UNMOVIC instigated a rolling programme of training on a wide range of topics: the work of UNSCOM; the origins, mandate and legal framework of the commission; the scope and nature of Iraq's weapons programmes; monitoring and inspection techniques; and health and safety.