

norm since treaty inception. When compliance has not been forthcoming, peer pressure has been the tool of choice, and has proven effective.⁷⁰

Adaptability

The ability of arms control treaties to adapt to changing security contexts is important for long-term viability. If an arms control treaty is unable to shift to changing security conditions, it will quickly lose relevance. Has this been the case with the CFE? Since its inception in 1990, the CFE has shown remarkable adaptability to changing conditions on the continent, but it faces significant challenges of adaptation in the years to come.

The CFE's historical adaptability stands out. First, the ability to adapt to changing security contexts after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were what best characterized the changes involved in the 1999 Adaptation Agreement. Russian concerns since the signing of the 1990 CFE Treaty had been extensive. A balance was quickly reached between Soviet and NATO forces, but was subsequently undermined by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991-92. Russia found itself in a very different geopolitical position than when CFE negotiations began in 1990. Ex-Warsaw Pact members were seen as potential new members in NATO, and ex-Soviet republics were now independent actors, not directly controlled by Moscow. This meant that the 1990 CFE Treaty was detrimental to Russian security concerns – the TLE limits that were based on bloc-to-bloc considerations were no longer valid, and Soviet TLEs had to be shared among the successor states of the Soviet Union. The Tashkent Agreement (1992) among CFE member states (plus Georgia) of the former Soviet Union divided TLE limitations formerly held by Moscow, and provided a very early example of adaptability.⁷¹

The negotiations over the Adaptation Agreement formalized the shift of the CFE from a Cold War treaty to a treaty dealing with the new European security environment. The shift from bloc-to-bloc TLE limitations to national TLE ceilings removed, at least at the treaty level, the old East-West divide. Both the national ceiling limits and the territorial limits dealt extensively with Russian concerns about regional security with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the declining security balance between Russia and its neighbours to the West. The shift was embedded in the CFE, showing its high level of adaptability.⁷²

But adaptability is the area where the greatest threat to the CFE's long-term viability rests. While historically it has shifted well, there are several new concerns that will test the treaty in the near future. New security threats within Europe, exemplified by the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Russian changes in military/nuclear strategy, and the events of September 11th, have changed the nature of threats to states in Europe, and as such affected the role of arms control treaties. The type of conflict that the Balkans experienced during the 1990s, and the broader implications it could potentially have had for the region, are issues that the CFE deals with. Small arms and non-traditional military means were used to inflict the greatest damage during these conflicts. To ensure long-term peace and stability in Europe in an environment where genocide is possible, it is necessary then that the CFE work in tandem with other Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as outlined in the 1999 OSCE Vienna Document. But while some have argued that the CFE should become involved in the regulation of the types of conflicts we have seen in the Balkans, and deal with "demand side" management,⁷³ this is not particularly feasible, as it exceeds the mandate given to the CFE, even in its adapted form. A greater integration of the means to control the sources of conflict, from traditional conventional weapons to small arms, and ensuring regional domestic stability is necessary, and thus a difficult challenge for the CFE and other CSBMs in the future.

New Russian military strategy, especially with regards to non-strategic nuclear capabilities, has an impact on the conventional arms control agenda. With the decline in the conventional capabilities of

⁷⁰ Interview with Department of National Defence official, Ottawa, February 26, 2003.

⁷¹ See Crawford, 2003.

⁷² McCausland, 1997.

⁷³ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe: The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001*, RAND, 2000. His argument is that the CFE should become a manager of the "resort to arms", focusing on issues such as police monitoring, the establishment of international legal institutions, regulation of the press, etc. p. 25-28.