new locations to NWS, begin a satellite reconnaissance programme, acquire passive detection systems for a Canadian Arctic SOSUS, and develop a mine-laying capability adequate to the relatively small-scale requirements of the Arctic.[33] To employ the distinction made earlier, however, none of this would allow Canada to operate in the Arctic Ocean, although we can assume that even here passive detection would be possible. In pursuing this option, Canada would effectively draw the line at its territorial Arctic boundary, and accept that naval activities in the Arctic Ocean would be left to the superpowers to manage.

[33] This assumes that the unit cost difference between the lowest cost nuclear submarine (the Rubis) and a state-of-the-art diesel submarine may be as much as $200 million per copy; that an Arctic SOSUS and minelaying capability might be approximately $300 million; that, following the argument of Beattie and Greenaway (footnote 25) net additions to the NWS system would cost approximately $300 million; and that, beginning in the 1990s, following the calculations of Collins (footnote 26), a space-based system could be developed at a cost of $300 million per annum over five years. (Of course, putting the options in this way depends entirely on a final determination about the number of nuclear submarines envisaged.)