

The Secretary-General also said that whatever may be the legal situation under the Charter regarding consent, "in practice, the consent must obviously be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operation of the United Nations Force." (*Ibid.*, p. 44-45)

I am satisfied myself that the United Nations Force, which has already operated effectively and non-controversially and has given us hope for the future role of the United Nations in the supervision of peace can, if it is given the opportunity and the authority, conduct these new peace supervision operations equally effectively. Absurd suspicions have been cast on this Force by the representative of the Soviet Union and by the representative of Bulgaria, I think it was, this afternoon; absurd suspicions were cast on this Force as an agency for the return of colonialism in a new form to this area. All I can say in this connection is that the Force is under the control not of any one Power, either here in this Assembly or on the spot, but it is under the control of the United Nations and that it is a Force consisting of important elements from those well-known "colonial Powers" India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Finland.

When doubts about this Force are expressed by the countries of the Middle East, I accept the honesty of their doubts although I do not believe that they are justified. I can assure them that as far as our delegation is concerned—and I am sure that it is true of practically all other delegations that have supported this Force—we have never at any time conceived of this Force as anything which could remotely be called an occupation force. It is not a national army or a collection of national contingents; it is an emergency force from the United Nations composed of units from countries—the smaller countries—of diverse backgrounds and policies, which is not in a position to enforce its will on any country, nor has it the power to do so under the Charter if it so desired. As a member of our delegation said last December in his statement in the General Assembly, the United Nations Emergency Force is not an instrument for enforcing a settlement but it can be an instrument to assist in establishing conditions in the area which would be of benefit to both the parties concerned and advantageous to peace and security.

As midnight approached the Soviet representative offered a motion that the first draft resolution should be voted on at once, but that the second—which, he said, "embraces a series of complex matters"—be postponed for three days. Only eight delegations voted for this motion, and the Assembly proceeded to the two draft resolutions. The first of these was adopted by 74 votes to 2 (Israel and France), with 2 abstentions (Luxembourg and The Netherlands). The second was adopted by 56 votes, none opposed, and 22 abstentions (the Soviet bloc, the Arab states, Israel, France and The Netherlands).

The explanation given by the French Delegation of its vote is of interest as a commentary on the debate:

My delegation voted against the first draft resolution in conformity with the stand which we have already taken and for the same reasons which are, in our opinion, still valid. We regret that we could not go along with the vote on the second resolution and we had to abstain. We feel that this resolution, while it is a praiseworthy initiative inasmuch as it may lead to the re-establishment of peace and security in the region concerned, consists of recommendations which are insufficient and too imprecise. They lend themselves to divergent interpretations, as we realized during the course of the debate.

No immediate action was taken by Israel as a result of the further exhortation to withdraw its forces. It continued to maintain that the provisions of the second resolution, (A-3518) did not provide adequate assurances that its interests in the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba would be protected. Thus the vicious circle had not been broken, some members of the Assembly holding that withdrawal must be immediate and unconditional, and others that Israel was justified in expecting reasonable "assurances" before it gave up existing means of guarding against raids and embargoes.