fully elaborated in all its details, but not published or intended to be published at present. Publication has been urged upon us; and steps have been taken to enforce publication; there are, however, good reasons for refusing these requests. The Naval Defence Act programme was published, and showed what was intended for five years as a maximum. France and Russia at once took steps to increase their expenditure, and to keep pace with us, so that the net result of this great effort leaves us relatively much as before in ships built and building. A programme there must be for continued and efficient administration. If it is not published there is a possibility of its being made the standard of what other nations will do. We watch their proceedings; we can build more quickly, and so we can alwyas keep a lead in completed ships besides choosing types that will outclass those they have laid down. (Applause.) Obviously this is a common-sense and safe policy. It secures our supremacy on the seas, and leaves freedom of action to the Admiralty; but it demands the provision of the means requisite for the work to be done in order to fulfil the requirements laid down by the responsible professional advisers of the Government, and from this burden, even in times like the present, the country will not recoil. (Applause.)—Naval and Military Record.

THE KHEDIVE OF THE SIDAR

The Khedive's version of the recent "frontier incident" related by his Highness himself to a gentleman, and who has given the Daily Telegraph full permission to make it public, is to the following effect:—"Before I went to Upper Egypt I asked my Minister if there were any objection to my taking Maher-Pasha, the Under-Secretary for War, with me, as Schudi Pasha, the War Minister, being a civilian, was not sufficiently acquainted with military affairs. The Ministers said there was no objection whatever. I, therefore, took Maher to accompany me, giving him orders not to interfere or put himself forward unless asked."

The Khedive first reviewed the army at Wady Haifa. With the Camel Corps the cavalry, and the artillery, his Highness was pleased, and he expressed his satisfaction to both the English- and native officers. But the second battalion marched past badly, and the Khedive observed to the English officer in command: "I am sorry to find that the marching of this battalion is not as good as the others; but I trust that your men will soon do their work better." This was said in the presence of General Kitchener, who replied to the Khedive that there was no fault to find with the battalion, and that his Highness,comment would discourage the men. To this his Highness retorted, that being Khedive and Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army he had a right to express his opinion, but that his remark was so trifling that there was no necessity for any further discussion on the subject.

His Highness subsequently embarked on board the steamer, accompanying General Kitchener, and continuing on good terms with him. At Assouan the Khedive inspected the hospital, and was much pleased with it, but after returning to the steamer, his doctor, Comanos Pasha, told him the situation was faulty. As the surrounding land was irrigated, the site of the hospital must be damp, and, he added, a native officer had reported privately to him (Comanos Pasha) that the English doctor in charge was negligent and inattentive. On hearing this the Khedive complained to General Kitchener, who replied that his Highness was no judge of the matter, as he changed his opinion so suddenly; and at the same time, the Sirdar asked whether the Khedive would express his satisfaction at the state of the troops in a general Army Order, the General adding that if the Khedive refused the English officers at Wady Haifa would resign, and that no other officers in England would care to replace them. His Highness replied that he had expressed his opinion up to a certain limit, and he would not go beyond it.

General Kitchener, speaking in a high tone of voice, responded, "I do not think you have any limit in this case," at the same time tendering his resignation. The Khedive thereupon told General Kitchener that he would not allow him to speak in this manner, and advised him to think over the matter. His Highness added that there was no necessity for futher discussion on the subject; but he hoped the Sirdar would withdraw his resignation, because if once accepted could not be withdrawn.

General Kitchener then withdrew his resignation, a quiet talk ensued, and the Khedive requested the Sirdar to return to Wady Haifa, to smooth over difficulties with the officers there, but should any officer insist upon leaving the army to telegraph to him at once, and he would put matters straight.

General Kitchener at once left for Wady Haifa, promising his Highness that nothing more should be heard about what had taken place. Two days later, however, the Khedive received a telegram from the Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha, informing him that Lord Cromer had heard from General Kitchener that the dispute had taken place, that things were serious, and that the (Riaz Pasha) was coming to meet his Higness to give explanations.

When the Khedive heard from Riaz what promises had been made to Lord Cromer by his Ministers he was annoyed, and blamed them for having made an ypromise without first hearing his side of the story. His Highness, however, consented to do what Lord Cromer asked.

When Lord Cromer is better the Khedive will explain the whole affair to his Excellency.

THE STUDY OF MINOR TREATIES.

CAPTAIN LOUIS TEBUTT, IN THE VOLUNTEER SERVICE GAZETTE.

It would appear very presumptious on the part of a junior volunteer officer to lay down any definite course for the study of minor tactics. These thoughts are some that have occurred while attempting to make oneself a proficient in the art of using small bodies of troops that would be the lot of most volunteer company officers to command.

What drill is to the private, tactics is, or ought to be, to the officer. Tactics comprise a very wide range, and it is only to minor tactics that these thoughts have reference. Drill has only one direct use, viz., the arranging that certain words and signals mean that certain actions are to be executed. Words of command are only abbreviated explanations of actions to be performed. It has other indirect uses, principal among them being the inculcating of obedience and discipline. Drill should become embodied in the nature of a soldier, and the word of command given and obeyed intuitively. In the same way tactics should become to the officer the natural carving out of the right action at the right time.

In the stress of danger in front of the enemy, officers, even as men, have not the same power of closely reasoning out what is the right thing to do, even if they have the time allowed them. Men are taught to obey implicitly, and officers must spontaneously understand two things: 1st, what they are generally ordered and expected to do; 2nd, how to do it. Tactics should teach us the first, and tactics plus drill the second.

How far are we volunteer company officers learning not to be found wanting? Are we going the right way to qualify for the supreme moment when our country, the lives of our men and ourselves, will depend to a certain extent on being ready with the right decision? A wrong decision may mean death to those entrusted to our care and command. Not lives laid down for the good of our country, but lives needlessly wasted through our own incapacity. It surely behoves us to do our best to prepare ourselves, for with the greatest amount of preparation, every officer will be very far short of perfection. It must have been often in our minds that there is a great gap between drill and tactics. Many officers can move their men fairly well, and many can form the right judgment as to a certain military situation, but how many can combine the two, crystallising the sound judgment and the tactics of the situation into words and issue the right orders, not leaving out a single necessary injunction or bothering the men's minds with a lot of unnecessary phrases.

This missing link one might call practical minor tactics. Often an officer understands the principles of outpost work, and yet cannot tell off a picket correctly or make a sentry understand his duties. It is easy to say the advance guard must turn an occupied obstacle, and yet how difficult to practically carry it out with your men without hindering the column behind you or scattering your men prematurely over the country side.

Volunteer officers are accustomed to issue certain orders in stiff parade movements, but if pitch-forked into the field would hardly know how to make use of the drill they had been taught, and yet the whole intent of it is for that purpose. One cannot feel it is a pity we are taught such a lot of unnecessary drill movements. Even our new drill book includes square formation with the note that it is only to be used against savages. And yet many volunteer battalions practice it just as if we are likely to fight Zulus and Hottentots on the Dorking Hills. But are not the echelon movements about as antiquated? One cannot find a single book in which various forms of attack are propoundedd (and there are many) in which it is necessary for the captains to know what to do on the command "Advance in echelon at ten paces distance from the right."

Drill we must have, but let it be in extended order in battle formation, and in battalion let it be formation for attack as a flank battalion, and carry it out exactly as the march past; we shall not want echelon formations and squares then. This would reduce the gap somewhat between what we practice in principle, and what we shall have to do in time of war. In judging of the progress we are making in tactics the same scale applies to the judging of a nation.

At first it is necessary to govern by rule, and when the rules are understood principles can be studied. Rules cramp and hem; principals allow certain latitude, and, to a certain extent, judgment. A man even though his judgment is weakened by fear and the horrible sights of war round about him, and is deprived of his best power of reasoning, will still do the right thing and give the right order. It is his nature and his habit which govern him.

There are many ways of learning minor tactics. The best school is no doubt war itself. But it is doubtful if war would teach all that is necessary. An example will show this. The first line of attack takes up only one third of the troops; two captains only in a battalion will, if they