

criticism." Though greatly averse to a "paper Pope," its votaries seem to see no impropriety in the assumption of infallibility on the part of a linguistic theorist—an infallibility so absolute that merely to hesitate in allegiance is to risk excommunication from the guild of scholarship.

These unique and imperious assumptions are based upon the fact that the so-called "higher criticism" is in the hands of trained specialists, that it is based on palpable facts and conducted on rigorously scientific principles, and with the bloodless impartiality of the scientific spirit. The judgments so reached are confidently affirmed to have almost the authority of mathematic demonstration.

As to the first of these particulars, it is not always sufficiently recognized that the critical and the judicial functions are by no means synonymous; and that the very specialization which by narrowing the field of study and sharpening the discriminating faculty may pre-eminently qualify for the one, may to the same degree disqualify for the other. It is proverbial that the good advocate makes a bad judge; bad in the latter capacity in proportion as he was good in the former. Perhaps no class of thinkers have been more frequently the victims of intellectual stampede, more extravagantly credulous on the one hand or gregariously skeptical on the other than specialists. The enthusiasm of original research, the disproportionate expansion of the subject of vision under steady gaze, the fear of discredit through ultra conservatism, class pride, these and other motives operate unconsciously often to precipitate toward ill-weighed conclusions. That in the purely literary aspects of the questions here considered the opinion of literary experts may have special value seems a reasonable claim. But what is a "literary" as distinguished from a linguistic expert? Clearly the terms are not used as synonymous, and ambiguity at once arises. Linguistic laws are reasonably definite and accessible, and verification of accuracy is possible. Not so in the case of the "literary" decisions, which are supposed to be the utterances of a certain refined and exquisite faculty whose verdicts are beyond review or criticism by ordinary scholarship, being subject to no definite canons. It is hard to understand how an acquaintance, however minute, with Hebrew philology, or a literary taste, however subtle and acute, can alone supply fitness, exclusive fitness especially, for the solution of problems that sweep around the whole horizon of human history and human thought.

It should not be forgotten by those who are summoned to surrender their "traditional" conception of the Pentateuchal narrative, at the bidding of the new criticism, that the very epithet which aims to stigmatize the current view as effete and discredited, does in fact suggest an argument in its behalf. Even "tradition," although of itself inadequate, is yet actual evidence in favor of that which it indorses; evidence that,