

his circumstances. Impulsive feeling or feelings, at desire he is anxious to think of all the motives in harm, a better living, etc., A subjective resolution or he shall have to leave his motives appealing to him in the feeling of consent. Feeling of consent over such will acquire. He succeeds of subjective irresolution weakening the force of some strengthening the force of of those over which he is they are compared, gradually in himself the feeling of America; and in consequence his subjective resolution, his experience makes him underlying principles of

ective states of the will in consent, and irresolution will:—(1) a movement from one of resolution, in other from one of irresolution, of consent, or from one of

ner in which these three only one mode of operating pages, and so fully

and exactly in accordance even. But we go further only one mode, but also that movement which we from time to time, the Ego a state of irresolution or consent to their gratification act on the subjective

his movement. As they truth will be plain from opposite, and non-consent from a subjective feeling same class, it is virtually motives, to one of non-consent to a subjective feeling of and general one, namely, one of consent; in other referred to, is also virtually cause a subjective feeling

the impulse of motives is of non-consent to one of the subjective feeling of the movement in the present at special pains to

would remark that the be carried on within a particular line of conduct, obtain a favourable verdict

from his jury, or the pulpit efforts of the clergyman to stir up his people to good works. A splendid example of this outside agency is Judah pleading with Joseph for the release of his brother Benjamin, as recorded in Genesis.

We close by giving an analysis or explanation of some few words used in connection with the Will:—

"Choice," for instance, is another name for subjective resolution or consent. We choose in favour of a motive when we subjectively resolve in favour of it.

"Rejection," in precisely the same way, may also be called another name for Non-consent.

"Purpose" or "Intention," thought of as a subjective state, is just subjective resolution, thoroughly aroused and resolved, to an act. A plan, purpose or intention, thought of as an object, is just an objective conception to which the subjective resolution has been accorded.

"Resignation" is the subjective consent associated with patience, a subjective feeling of the heart.

"Resolution" is just a different term for Consent; both mean the same subjective feeling.

The same facts may be asserted of Irresolution and Indecision.

Retrospect.

At this stage of the work it is necessary to remark that we have now very fully discussed the various powers of the mind as specified at the commencement of this work. At starting, we made the following popular division of the intellectual and moral powers of men, viz. (1) The Mind or Intellect; (2) The Heart (including Taste, Heart and Conscience); and (3) The Will; this division being based on the three following propositions: (1) Man is a knowing creature; (2) Man is a feeling creature; (3) Man is a voluntary creature.*

The functions of the Intellect, comprehending latent consciousness, conception, perception, inception, reasoning, imagination, knowledge (equal to a correct conception with the subjective feeling of assurance), and other like powers, were all fully discussed and explained in the first department of this work, the discussion terminating with page 11.

The functions of the Heart (comprehending Taste, the Heart, and the Conscience) were also fully disposed of under the respective heads of the subjective feelings of Taste, of the Heart and of the Conscience, so that the treatment of these functions may be regarded as completed under these heads. They are purely subjective feelings, and their operation in relation to outward motives or conceptions, and also their action as impulses or motives in themselves on the subjective resolution or will towards gratification or pacification being very fully explained, little more remained to be said of them; their action however in these respects, in other words, as motives, is still more elaborately discussed under the head of Will.

The functions of the Will, a no less important department of the human mind, have also been very fully treated. Composed also of subjective feelings, viz., consent, non-consent, and indecision, the operations of these feelings in regard to motives, and also with respect to the subjective energy or action, have been made the subject of minute and careful examination.

While we are not done yet with either of the foregoing subjects, there are certain phases or powers of the human mind to which we may in the first place very profitably direct our attention.

Instincts.

All instincts are supposed to be certain innate tendencies or controlling principles existing in the Ego, which exercise a certain influence over his thoughts and actions. All instincts may be divided into two classes, the Conscious and Unconscious.

The Conscious instincts are those controlling principles of our nature which we can perceive, feel, or be conscious of while they act upon us. They are just those subjective feelings of the Heart, Conscience, etc., in other words, subjective motives of which we have already treated so fully in various places. The term "Conscious instincts" is then but another name for these subjective feelings. We know of no other conscious instincts than these, and we might just as well have omitted saying anything at all about conscious or any other kind of instincts, were it not that the term instincts is often applied to subjective feelings in works of this class. These instincts also might have as well been called sentient as conscious, seeing they are subjective senses.

* While making the above division of man's intellectual and moral powers, we did not overlook a still more simple elementary division of the same powers, viz., that of subjective conception and subjective feeling, to which two elements mostly all these powers may be reduced, and to which we shall again have occasion to refer at a further stage of this work. The above division, however, we have reckoned the most suitable for the treatment of the subjects which we have undertaken,