with us and our ally to ferve that her darling purpose. In this case France would undountedly have joined with Prussia, and a war in Germany would have been accelerated and rendered inevitable, which Britain laboured to avert. In fuch an alliance for fuch ends as Austria proposed, all appearances of fuccess were by recent experience proved to be against us. The Dutch would not engage, and Russa was at too great a distance even in the author's opinion, p. 38, to be a very effectual ally. Thus circumstanced, we had nothing to expect from the Austrian project but a sure increase of expence beyond that of the former war, and a more than probable repetition of losses and defeats; at the end of which we should be obliged to fit down under a load of additional debt, with the doubled diffrace of having unsuccessfully broken thro' the most folemn treaty, first concluded at the instant prayer and for the immediate falvation of the house of Austria, and again renewed and confirmed for the same end and from the fame motives.

In this fituation the treaty of Westminster was signed in January 1756, merely with a view p. 94, 97, on our side to keep the French out of Germany; and on the Prussian side to be protected from a Russian invasion; without a single shilling to be paid