s for the seems to at for any s not yet d on the

ajority of settlers. European glishmen emselves since the n on the pirit and

fixing a provided gly, four ria, and trength. It must t it will lation of provided ground rence of Western ers, and.

with the English ources. we culiar ropeans rule is become ing the chiefly ct, and excesnen in etween nen to ime at

The ris, to Malta

which vided and ward

## MILITARY DEFENCES IN THE COLONIES.

17

Leeward Islands. Jamalca must, I appreliend, be admitted as falling more or less within the category of places of which the occupation conduces to the general strength of the empire abroad. The regular troops in it ought, doubtless, to be reduced within the smallest compass which Her Majesty's Government, assisted by professional advisers, may consider compatible with safety; but so long as a Colonial system is upheld at all, I should think it could not be denied that this great island ought to be the seat of some Imperial force, maintained at the national charge. In the Windward and Leeward Islands I quite admit that the troops ought not to be scattered about for purposes of police, but I think that there ought to be some small central force sufficient to protect any arsenals that we possess in this region, and also to be moved in case of need to any scene of insurrection or civil disturbance.

## EASTERN COLONIES.

CEVLON appears to have contained, in 1857, about 2,386 troops. The War Office Return appended to the Report exhibits the charges at home for the troops serving in the Colonies, including a proportion of the whole dead weight of the British army, the cost of transport, and the military expenditure on the spot. This last amounted, for Ceylon, in 1857, to 137,776 .., of which the Colony paid 74,359 .., or an ample half. Whether it should be required to increase this contribution must be a question for Her Majesty's Government. This Colony at present is spending large sums on railways and other reproductive works. The more, of course, that it may be judged proper to take for military purposes, the less will remain for those other objects which promote the development of wealth.

MAURITUS.—The force in 1857 was 850, the military expenditure on the spot 74,215*l.*; the contribution of the Colony, 17,795*l.*, which has since been increased. The island could probably afford more, and if symmetry be thought a desirable object, when practicable, this Colony might be able to contribute, as Ceylon has done, a sum equal to about half the cost on the spot of providing for its defence and internal security.

HONG KONG.—The force in 1857 was 826; the expenditure on the spot 67,1801. This Colony has only recently been able to defray its civil expenditure, it has contributed nothing towards its military expenditure; and I suppose it t the garrison will always be within the limit of the amount decmed indispensable for general national objects.

## WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA.

On the settlements in this part of the world I have submitted at an earlier stage some general observations. The force in 1857 was 1,012; the expenditure on the spot was 58,946 l., of which 699 l. was locally contributed. It would certainly appear desirable that the forces on this coast should be kept within the smallest amount consistent with the objects for which they are employed. Whether they can be reduced, and to what extent, is a military question, that can only be dealt with by the Government, with the aid of such military advice as it may deem it necessary to take.

## CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

ONE considerable Colony alone has not been noticed in the preceding review, and that is the Cape of Good Hope. At this place we maintain, not a garrison, but rather an army. The average force for five years would seem by Parliamentary Returns to have been 7,000, and in 1857 it is reported by the War Office at upwards of 10,000. Exclusive of all home charges, and of the cost of transport, the military expenditure of 1857 is returned at 649,878 *l*, being nearly two-thirds of a million. In the same year was voted one of a series of annual grants of 40,000*l*., for civilising the Kaflirs, and averting disputes with the natives. It is true that these efforts have given us the satisfaction of being able to say that we have not had a Kaflir war, but nine or ten thousand troops constitute such an  $_{282}$ .