

as certainly would be the case if the Bill were passed in its present form.

● (1220)

I am not contravening my oath of office in indicating some of these concerns. I am not contravening the Official Secrets Act in publicizing some of the things I want to publicize in the House today. Anything I intend to say here today has already been published in Canada by others. I am prepared to back it up by showing anyone the articles, stories or books which are source material for the argument I am making today.

First let me indicate the extent of the problem. To eavesdrop on any person in this country, in any place at any time, no physical intrusion or trespass is necessary. The technology exists, for example, for anyone in the American Embassy on Wellington Street to eavesdrop on conversations taking place in offices in these Parliament Buildings, or vice-versa. One can buy a microphone on the electronic market here in Canada today that is smaller than a 25-cent piece but which can hear whispers through walls almost two miles away. In the early 1960s the Americans were able to listen to Krushchev having a conversation in a limousine by means of a satellite rebroadcast in space. Aimed parabolic microphones can pick up quite clearly conversations taking place ten miles away. Laser devices can be aimed at windows or even walls and can rebroadcast conversations by reproducing those conversations from the smallest measurable vibrations on those flat surfaces. Hundreds of sophisticated tape recorders are turning right now in Canada, recording conversations that have been activated by the use of certain code words or phrases which automatically turn them on.

The eavesdropping of conversations is one of the major and most efficient tools being used today in the battle against crime and the gathering of information of all sorts, both by public agencies and, I suspect, by private organizations. Internally, domestically here in Canada this industry is supposed to be controlled either by judicial warrant for criminal investigation or ministerial warrant for security investigations, or prohibited by law for private or personal use.

I suspect, although I have no proof, that accountable, effective control, supervision or prohibition, as the case may be, is largely illusory in this country. There is simply too much of it going on both within and without the Government. In this Bill, the authorization process for security targeting is moved from the Minister's office to the courtroom. A few monitoring or auditing group will have new inspection powers if they know, can find and put realistic controls and auditing practices on the use of the facilities. Obviously, I remain pretty skeptical but I am willing to see how it works out.

I am concerned that there is still at least one very large gap in this whole process over which neither the Minister nor this Bill seems to envisage any accountable control in any way whatsoever. The impression the Minister attempts to convey is that this Bill, in conjunction with Part IV of the Criminal Code which deals with criminal investigation, specifies that henceforth all legal authorizations for third party eavesdrop-

Security Intelligence Service

ping or the obtaining of information by electronic or other means will have to be judicially authorized. That quite definitely, quite seriously and quite dangerously is totally wrong.

We have a so-called ultra-secret agency in this country that quite closely works with, feeds into and extracts from both the huge National Security Agency's sprawling facilities and the computer complex in Fort George Mead in Maryland, Washington, and also the large listening and cryptological centre in the United Kingdom that has been in the news lately because of certain spy and union problems.

Canada's agency is mainly operational here in the Ottawa area and is called the Communications Security Agency, the CSE. I am willing to bet that most Members of Parliament here in the House today, and I surmise even some Cabinet Ministers, have never heard of the CSE. In the scheme of things, it is located under the jurisdiction of the Department of National Defence, although it is never listed in the Estimates, never mentioned in any budgetary item in this House or any of its committees and rarely appears on departmental organizational charts. I am also willing to bet that even some Ministers of National Defence have never heard of it.

The purpose of the three or more nation group is to monitor all telephone, telegraph, telex, microwave, or radio emission signals or messages anywhere in the world or in space, and they do it. Sensitive radio receivers tap microwave and satellite transmissions of telephone conversations, for instance, while a computer equipped with limited speech recognition capability quickly filters through thousands of tapes and intercepts by seizing on key words. It would not take too much imagination to believe that four triggering words would be "diplomat, terrorist, bomb" and "explosion". I leave it to Members to think of some of the other trigger words.

Decoding devices and unscrambling gear are obviously an integral part of its facilities. These agencies, Canada's included, obviously not only listen to international wave lengths. By their nature, they have the potential to listen in to everything and anything that hits the airwaves and more, both outside and inside Canada. Computer data banking information is fed by telephone facilities. Telephonic communications are carried on by microwave. Microwaves are intercepted by this agency.

I am not arguing that these facilities for both security and economic purposes are not necessary or useful. I am arguing that this Bill does not seem to recognize either that ministerial knowledge or judicial approval that is designed to lull us into the comfortable belief that all is well and being controlled, authorized and monitored.

There is a terrible potential for abuse in the CSE and its allied and international agencies in other countries. They can, and I am convinced they do, listen in, break into, decode and store conversations of people in this country with no independent control, supervision or monitoring.

In conclusion, may I say that at a time when more and more personal, private, governmental and commercial communication and transmission is being handled through the airwaves, including easy access to data banks, it is simply appalling that