

action as is within our power to see that there be not reenacted the tragedies of 1914 and 1939.

Were Canada to defeat this resolution, were she to refuse to send a delegation to San Francisco, she would forfeit the high position she has now secured in the councils of the world. That would be the result should she stand aside at this critical time and refuse to join in the struggle which must confront the delegation to San Francisco.

I submit that this resolution should carry unanimously, and I congratulate the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) upon his masterly presentation of the subject in opening the debate. I rejoice that the Canadian delegation to San Francisco will be led by a statesman of the knowledge and wisdom of the present Prime Minister of Canada.

I am also pleased that probably included in the delegation will be the amiable gentleman who leads the official opposition—although I must confess that so far he has contributed very little to the debate on the subject. But I would suggest that, if the delegation is to have a Progressive-Conservative wing, we place in the estimates the price of an alarm clock, so that when they are there they will have their speeches written on time. It might be worth while were we to pay the cost of some vitamins, to pep them up a bit, and enable them to recover from that inferiority complex in international affairs which has always afflicted members of that party.

The resolution provides, in the first instance, that we accept the invitation to San Francisco, and secondly that we approve the principles and purpose of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals—in effect the maintenance of international peace and security. Those proposals are put forward as a satisfactory general basis for discussion. The government's policy is expressed in the resolution. It is easy indeed for the house to approve in a general way any effort to maintain peace and security. The young lives and the treasure we have poured out in these last few years in the melting pot of war, and the horrors through which humanity has passed, are sufficient guarantee of our sincerity in that regard. We want no more of war with its loss and its bereavements.

It is easy to determine that Canada's delegates should go to the conference, but it is much more difficult to decide what our delegation should do when it gets there. Lest there be any misunderstanding in this regard, let me point out that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are not a statement of Canadian government policy. Except as an observer, Canada was not even there, and Canadian representatives took no part in the discussion which pre-

ceded the statement of proposals. They are the proposals of the big four who were there and therefore Canada is free to express her welcome or her commendation of the proposals, if she feels that way—or to criticize them. She is free to improve them if possible. The proposals were drawn without the presence of the great body of the allied nations. I think it is fair, therefore, to assume that the proposals will be modified, perhaps materially modified, when the smaller nations are heard. I sincerely hope that they will be changed in the discussions to take place at San Francisco; for in my opinion the Prime Minister and his associates will need all the wisdom they possess if this conference is not to be wrecked on the tangled skeins of these practical proposals. It will take all the wisdom and good will of our delegation and other delegations to assure that the international house of cards which may be erected in San Francisco does not collapse in wrack and ruin as did the house of the league of nations.

There are many reasons advanced as to why the league failed in the crisis. But in my humble opinion, one of the primary reasons for the failure of the league of nations was that the big four assumed to boss the show. The next reason was that the nations, including the big four, failed to carry out in action the high principles they expressed in memoranda. It was because of the lack of effectiveness and will to hold together, and the set-up which in practice gave to the big four undue control in the councils of the nations. It was because the small and medium nations permitted themselves to be treated as inferiors. Had the set-up of the league of nations been more democratic; had it been in very truth a parliament of the world, the United States would probably have joined in the deliberations. Confidence would have developed among the nations, and in the time of testing they might have relied upon collective security instead of each trying to save his own hide, with a total disregard for the welfare of others.

According to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the same general scheme is to be followed. The big five in matters of vital importance assume to be the whole thing. Frankly, I wonder how likely of permanent success is such an arrangement.

Let me pause to commend the men who at Dumbarton Oaks framed these proposals. They made a good beginning. One must realize that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are an offer by the big five to all other allied nations of a scheme of association entirely satisfactory to themselves, something