

(4) Firms offering training places do so based on economic necessity. Unions feel that some firms benefit from the low wage paid to apprentices in order to fulfill their own needs, not those of the apprentice.

(5) Small companies generally cannot afford to keep on their apprentices after the training period, although highly skilled workers have increased chances of finding interesting, well-paid work.

(6) In this trade, a third-year apprentice receives approximately half the wage of a certified worker even though they have equal skill levels. In industry, certified workers often receive better pay because their wages are performance related.

(7) Employee's unions support the dual system but see areas for improvement. For example, at the moment, apprentices are on the shop floor for four days and in school for one day. Unions would like this expanded to three days work/two days school. Employers also support the system, yet do not necessarily believe that greater classroom time will improve the training given.

(8) Unions would like a second day in the school to give apprentices a broader educational base. In some cases, the training received in a firm is not sufficient to give a high skill level. An extra day of schooling would compensate in these instances. Training is not always consistent from firm to firm.

(9) All apprentices fall under the same legal framework. Unions feel that legislation should distinguish between certain categories of trades and vocations according to different skill levels.

(10) The labour movement has a voice as to what should be taught in vocational training but, legally, the Chamber of Commerce controls the quality of training given.

(11) There is a growing problem of recently certified apprentices being unable to find jobs in their particular trade often, due simply to frictional unemployment. Between the age of 19 and 25, 30,000 (45%) trained apprentices can't find work. More coordination is needed between training given and labour market needs. Nonetheless, skilled workers have better job chances than do unskilled workers with no training.

(12) Apprentices need more training of the kind that gives them the ability to adapt to new needs

and to expand knowledge. Advanced-level vocational/technical schools give more of this kind of training than lower level schools.

(13) Two institutes (one run by employees' unions and one run by the Chamber of Commerce) offer re-training courses.

(14) Re-training lasts from four to 14 months.

(15) Steel workers and manual workers are those who have the most difficulty re-training. The feeling of being uprooted at the age of 45 is one of the psychological problems that must be overcome.

(16) Apprentices are now being trained to accept the fact that they may have to change vocations during their working life.

(17) Geographic mobility is much harder to encourage due to barriers (e.g. wages and production costs vary from region to region; families are reluctant to leave their region).

**Interview with Paul-Pierre Valli**  
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**Paris, France**  
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(1) The French Minister of Social Affairs, Employment and Training, Philippe Seguin, has recently launched a three-stage attack on unemployment in France (now at the level of 2.5 million).

(2) The initial two stages are in progress and seem to be operating smoothly. Mr. Seguin first tackled youth unemployment with a program that seeks to improve the status of young people. Although young workers may be paid less than the minimum wage by a private enterprise, the government picks up the tab for social benefits and offers government-financed training opportunities.

(3) The second stage of Mr. Seguin's program focuses on discussions with all social partners. The aim is to introduce more flexibility into wage regulations governing part-time and temporary work.

(4) The third, and more contentious aspect of the plan, involves government-sponsored collective utility jobs (les travaux d'utilité collective — T.U.C.) which have intrinsic social value but which may be costly for or unattractive to the private sector.