

indication for example that the UN Centre for Human Rights<sup>4</sup> or any other part of the UN made it its' task to ensure that the report was impressed upon senior UN decision makers. Furthermore, there is absolutely no proof that senior decision makers were aware of the report, and thus it is hard to refute their more general claims that they had not been sufficiently aware of intelligence out of Rwanda that would have possibly alerted them to an impending disaster but certainly would have prepared them to respond rapidly once the crisis occurred.

Another example came to light when the Czech representative during the SC session of June 8th stated that the UN Secretariat had received field intelligence from UNAMIR of inflammatory broadcasts, the influx of arms, and government troop movements just prior to April 6, and had not informed the Security Council. It was implied by several observers that the Secretary General had had too much on his plate at the time and simply missed seeing this warning intelligence so as to authorize its being passed on. However, he has a large and politically sensitive office, so it is more likely that whomever received the information consciously choose not to pass it on. Was this due to the secretive nature of his office staff and the UN at large, ie. information is power and to be hoarded, or was it that such intelligence went counter to the plans of the SG's office, and so was filed away.

What is more surprising is that the Force Commander General Dallaire said that upon taking up his post, that he had not been warned to expect anything out of the ordinary. He was led to believe that this, his first peacekeeping mission, was to have been a relatively tranquil affair. He was caught very much by surprise when tensions built up in the early months of 1993. Prior to April 6th when he started receiving a number of written notes from moderate Hutu army officers warning of disquieting planning and training within the RGF he felt that it would not be easy to verify their fears. More critical in his decision to not follow up their warnings, was his repeatedly stated position then and since, that it was not part of the philosophy of peacekeeping nor his mandate to carry out any intelligence gathering much less pass on that information<sup>5</sup>. That policy seems particularly bizarre in light of the obvious disquiet of a number of NGOs as well as individuals inside and outside the UN particularly about gross and systemic human rights violations.<sup>6</sup> Why was he not briefed on what he might well face, and what his response should have been?

Integral to the success of this second stage of a functioning international early warning process consists of ensuring that relevant decision makers formally acknowledge or at least are in the position that they cannot even begin to deny knowledge. This is not to be confused with them

---

<sup>4</sup> This lack of advocacy by the Centre is dealt with at greater length in Chapter 5.2.

<sup>5</sup> Paradoxically the French forces during Operation Turquoise were obviously given the mandate to monitor human rights violations and they then reported their information to the Commission of Experts, see UN Doc S/1994/933 p.5, the report on Op. Turquoise from the French Mission to the UN SG

<sup>6</sup> This is dealt with at greater length in section 5.1 on human rights monitoring.