

stemming from contextual and geopolitical factors that are specific to the two regions, condition the final forms of the two stability pacts and limit the possibilities of comparing the SPSEE and CSP. All these reasons account for the paucity of comparative research on these two pacts.

As the architects of the CSP drew partly on the SPSEE, an evaluation of the latter experiment makes an excellent benchmark for gauging the chances of success of an eventual CSP, especially since the Caucasian players refer explicitly to the SPSEE.⁵ Beyond a mere comparison of the two pacts, necessarily limited by their basic differences, the aim of this report is to draw lessons from the SPSEE that are relevant for an eventual CSP.

This report is divided into three parts. Chapter 1 describes the main similarities and differences between the regions affected by the two pacts that their authors have to take into account. Chapter 2 deals with the CSP, analysing the project to see whether it forms an effective response to the specific problems of the Caucasus region. In Chapter 3, the CSP project will be assessed in light of the experience of the SPSEE. A concise summary of the activities, successes and failures of the latter pact will enable us to draw lessons for the development and potential implementation of a Caucasian security pact.

with the Balkan Stability Pact.” See Robert Cutler, “The Key West Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh: Preparing Peace in the South Caucasus?” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, April 2001. <<http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org>>.

⁵ Nathalie Tocci, a co-author of the CSP, mentions hesitating over the choice of a title for the project. In the end, the term “stability pact” was retained since the Caucasus leaders consulted used this term and compared it to the SEESP despite the obvious differences. See Nathalie Tocci, “The Stability Pact Initiatives: Reactions and Perspectives,” *Conférence: L’Europe et le Caucase du Sud / Europe and the South Caucasus*, Baku, June 11, 2001.