agree on quantitative reductions for fear that, remaining forces would become vulnerable and that the surety of being able to inflict unacceptable damage on the side which struck first would be compromised. For many critics in the United States, Robert McNamara's decision to fix the number of ICMBs at 1054, left America vulnerable-a charge that would be repeated in the 1970s as President Carter sought to negotiate substantial reductions.

To be sure, inter-service rivalries in the United States, especially between the Air Force and the Navy, helped in part to drive force building, and increase the number of weapons. But concern about the stability of deterrence was also an important factor. In redundancy lay survivability and therefore the credibility of deterrence. This was the rationale behind McNamara's push for the development of nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) with their Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In the 1970s, qualitative improvements to the relatively small arsenals, helped reduce the need for quantitative improvements. Thus both sides, sought to enhance the flexibility of their weapons and associated command and control systems in order that they would be able to hit a wider range of targets. But this in turn led to increased numbers as more weapons were needed to achieve flexibility. Developments in targeting combined with progress in satellite surveillance, allowed for greater accuracy, as with the advent of Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), which at once reduced the need for more launchers while increasing the number of warheads, thus making arms control even more difficult. It was in fact Kissinger who worked to keep MIRVs off the table during the SALT I negotiations. Throughout the Cold War, arms control was frustrated because both sides sought to enhance the survivability, flexibility and accuracy of their respective strategic nuclear arsenals.

There was another more intangible factor that militated against nuclear arms control, especially in the early part of the Cold War. Arms control had acquired a bad name during the period between the world wars. Not only had it failed to control arms, but it seemed to become part of the anti-appeasement lessons drawn by the western democracies from the history of those years. Faced with rising militarism and rapid rearmament in Germany and Japan, (the "rogue states" of the era) the West should have been building weapons if it wanted to avoid another world war, not trying to control them with what turned out to be useless treaties so disdainfully ignored by those bent on war. The watch word was, if you want peace, prepare for war, even nuclear war. This suspicion of arms control as a solution to meeting threats from states who cannot be trusted to keep agreements, colours current arms control efforts and lends support to the RMA.

In one important sense, though, concern about fostering instability through arms control, was a self-fulfilling prophecy. While the nuclear arms race was surely primarily a product of the global rivalry between East and West, that rivalry was itself fuelled by competitive force building. Both sides viewed the growth and technologically improved sophistication of the other's arsenal as proof of intent, if not for war, then at least for the enhancement of political influence through the threat of war.

One of the key arguments of this paper is that the future is likely to witness *both* force building in support of the RMA and arms control efforts to mitigate some of its potentially