

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Communities-Canada Transatlantic Declaration (TAD) issued on November 22, 1990, which outlines areas of mutual cooperation and consultation, provides a framework within which existing bilateral mechanisms (e.g., 1976 Framework Agreement) can be utilized and new ones developed. Most significantly, the TAD marks the formalization of high level political ties between Canada and the European Community.

This paper has a number of objectives: to probe the antecedents to the TAD; to demonstrate why the Declaration is a policy response to not only the pace of West European integration but also to increased US bilateralism; to demonstrate how, for domestic purposes, its release may reflect the Canadian government's desire to fortify a 'counterweight' to Canada's relations with the US; and, finally, how -- despite the failure of gaining support for a trans-Atlantic free trade agreement -- the TAD may increase the likelihood of a more balanced Canada-EC bilateral relationship in the years to come.

We have come to the conclusion that tCanada, to a considerable extent, overcame its handicap of being constrained by its middlepower status in face of larger interlocutors - the EC and particularly the US -- in pursuing its own TAD. As this paper's analysis of the negotiations leading up to the TAD shows - particularly the last six weeks - a Canadian TAD was not a foregone conclusion; the Canadian TAD was not an automatic outgrowth of German and/or American proposals (its conception is open to interpretation) for new trans-Atlantic links stressing the political and economic rather than the military. Rather, as the use of multi-level analysis demonstrates, Canadian political and bureaucratic actors, i.e. primarily SSEA Clark and a small number of middle and senior officials at EAITC, were able through the intense lobbying of the Commission, the EC Presidency, the other Member States, and the US, to overcome inherent systemic constraints against the ability of a smaller power to move policy initiatives. The combination of this lobbying and certain compromises on the Canadian side (e.g., not getting a trilateral declaration) resulted in the parallel negotiations of the Canadian and US TADS.

More generally, this paper shows that since 1989 Canada has embarked upon a fundamental re-evaluation of its European policy framework. During the forty year period ending in 1989, NATO and then the CSCE played the dominant roles in Canadian policy approaches to Europe, but now the Community is becoming the predominant pillar. This is not to say that the traditional security mechanisms, which provided Canada with a political entrée into Europe are dead or will die any time soon, rather it suggests that the priorities in Canada's foreign policy-making as a whole may be changing as Canada begins to feel more comfortable dealing bilaterally rather than concentrating on multilateral mechanisms.

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