

are far less significant or less well argued than this superb Israeli scholarship. However, the book is slightly flawed precisely because there is too much of the Israeli viewpoint, too much concentration on the strategic issues of the rivalry, and not enough on the economic and cultural imperatives of the Arabs' relationships with the superpowers, written by Arab authors and based on Arab sources.

The reviewer would recommend this thick tome as must for any graduate course on the Middle East or as a reference for the next five or six years, by which time, given the rapid changes occurring in the region today, it will be out-of-date.

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Arms and their men

by Simon Rosenblum

The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mind-Sets edited by Carl G. Jacobsen. Toronto: Oxford University Press (original publisher OUP of New York), 1987, 349 pages, US\$54.00.

This extremely valuable — but outrageously expensive — collection of essays sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides a comprehensive analysis of the political, military and technological forces that are changing the nature and likelihood of war. The thirteen contributors analyze emerging nuclear weapon technologies, including Star Wars, new generations of the cruise missile, the US Army's "deep strike" doctrine, the Soviet "Operational Maneuver Groups" and new naval dynamics. Carl Jacobsen (formerly at SIPRI and now at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security [CIIPS] in Ottawa) begins the collection by noting that, due to ongoing nuclear weapons modernization, "current arms dynamics threaten to relegate apparently sweeping cut-back agreements to the realm of spurious arms control." This concern is raised throughout the book.

The cruise missile, which is presently a major barrier to a US-Soviet strategic

nuclear arms deal, receives special attention in chapters by US arms control specialists William Kincade, Michael Krepon and Richard Fieldhouse. The unique role of the cruise missile in naval "power projection" is particularly examined and an American navy official is quoted as telling the US Congress that the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) provides "an increase in the range of escalation control options available to the nation without resort to central strategic systems." In other words, the SLCM blurs the firebreak between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons. The consequence is that the SLCM not only poses serious verification problems, but also increases the probability that any conflict involving US and Soviet naval forces would lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Even more troublesome would be the emergence of the advanced cruise missile with supersonic speed; making it a bona fide first-strike weapon.

The cruise missile is pointed to as an example of how the desirability of limiting a new military technology goes unrecognized until its control is exceedingly difficult or virtually impossible. A central theme running throughout the book is that the superpowers may be about to enter the "second nuclear age," and that this ongoing nuclear weapons modernization is a Pandora's Box which most often results in greater instability — any increases in stability derived from the mobile basing of missiles is said to be more than offset by the counterforce/first-strike capabilities gained through increased missile accuracy. Indeed a recent study by CIIPS indicated that the implementation of current US and Soviet nuclear reduction proposals could — with ongoing modernization — sharply increase the first-strike preemptive capabilities of both superpowers.

The emerging danger pointed to in this book is that the superpowers will soon have 21st-century weapons but 19th-century ways of thinking. The conclusion advocated by all contributors is that strong limits must be placed on nuclear weapons modernization and that military strategies based upon nuclear warfighting must be quickly changed. Gerard Smith, chief US SALT I negotiator, is quoted as telling the Secretary of State in 1980 that "if either side is striving for or appears to be striving for an effective first-strike capability, then there is no hope for strategic arms control."

Justice to this fine book cannot be done in a short review. As a state-of-the-art guide

to weapons developments and doctrines, I cannot recommend it too highly.

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Keeping the Pacific pacific

by Paul George

The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration by Sheldon Simon. Toronto: D.C. Heath Canada Ltd. (original publisher Lexington Books of Lexington, Mass.), 1988, 177 pages.

To most Asian states in the post-Vladivostok speech era, the Soviet Union is a legitimate participant in Asian-Pacific affairs. Under Gorbachev's leadership the Soviets have created a progressive image which has had a positive impact on their relations with the region. Whereas Moscow has diversified the competition in the Western Pacific and Asia, the US strategic message has remained unaltered since World War II. The United States remains intent on controlling the Eurasian rimland in classical geopolitical terms.

However, the future of security collaboration in the Asia-Pacific region is not one of resolving the discrepancy in burden sharing between Washington and its allies. US and allied threat perceptions are not congruent and the Pacific is not an "American lake." The new political circumstances require Washington to explain its strategic purpose in the region in a context that is broad enough to reflect contemporary geopolitical circumstances. Unfortunately the author offers no such guidance.

The geographical imbalance of the book does little to support the contention that "the potential for collaboration exists." Indeed, the format of the work raises the definitional question of what constitutes "Asian-Pacific?" Frequent mention is made of US priorities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, for example, but although indisputably part of Asia, India's potential role in the region is not considered. Canadian naval forces are recognized as participants in the biennial RIMPAC exercises, but Canada's wider Pacific interests are absent from the author's