

(c) On the other hand, "A very limited number of obligatory inspections" is precisely what the USA insists on, and what the USSR refuses to accept, and inclusion of this requirement in our proposal would mean that it was no longer a realistic compromise basis for negotiation.

(d) It is also suggested that our procedure would be construed by the Western nuclear powers as setting "a precedent for the final accord." The same objection could be made by the USSR if the proposed basis called for obligatory on-site inspection, but the point to be emphasized is that the arrangements we are suggesting are temporary and without prejudice to the nature of the permanent system. Our approach is also designed to find a system which would provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the arrangement.

2. I do not consider that it would be desirable merely to substitute the Western position for the arrangement we have suggested. If we cannot achieve agreement on the present basis, there are two suggestions which may be of some assistance:

(a) To alter slightly the procedure for initiating an on-site inspection by removing the words "a request ... for ..." in paragraph 3(iii) and "the request for" in paragraph 3(iv). This is essentially only a drafting change, but might make the text more acceptable.

(b) As a less satisfactory but possible fall-back position we might consider removing altogether the references to on-site inspection which occur in paragraphs 3(iii) and 3(iv). This would weaken our proposal and make it more open to conflicting interpretations, and should not be introduced unless the negotiations are deadlocked.

3. Before making any substantive amendments it seems to us desirable to make a forceful presentation of our views as they stand to the Western Four. I therefore wish you to give the text of our paper (omitting the explanatory notes, but incorporating the amendment referred to in paragraph 2(a) above) to your Western colleagues and request an early meeting to discuss it. Further instructions will be sent you when we have an indication of their reactions. In the meantime you should not discuss these ideas with any other delegation.

[H.C.] GREEN

54.

DEA/50271-M-40

*L'ambassadeur en Union soviétique
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Soviet Union
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 869

Moscow, November 29, 1962

SECRET. DEFERRED.

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By Bag Berlin from Bonn.

NUCLEAR TESTS

During our talk yesterday Khrushchev referred to nuclear test ban talks, and said that if West was ready to sign an agreement, he was ready. He had indicated willingness to accept "some element of international control" on Soviet territory. This concession had been made not repeat not because Khrushchev considered on-site controls necessary, but in order to make it easier for American Government to agree, and particularly to make it easier for President Kennedy to get a treaty through Congress. He said that this concession was to allow a few automatic stations "two or three of them" to be installed on Soviet territory with foreign