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clofe of the laft war, had learned the fecret of paralyzing this fpecies of hoftility. Can it then be expected, that with no enemy on the ocean, and with double the number of fhips of war, fhe will fit ftill, and permit us peaceably to rob her citizens? Every naval officer, and every merchant knows, however ignorant they may be at Wafhington, that fifty faft failing frigates would as completely blockade our ports, and fecure our privateers from the power of doing injury, as if they were under lock and key, or hauled up à la Jefferfon, in the dry docks of the Potomac.

We proceed then to confider the *other* branch of our means of aunoyance, which may be called commercial warfare.—It is maintained, that we can by a war bring Great-Britain to an acknowlcdgment of our claims; by confifcating the debts due to her merchants; by ruining her manufacturers; by refuting to be cloathed; and by flarving her Weft-India colonies. Although it would be eafy to fhew, that all thefe meafures would eventually produce more diffrefs to the United States than to Great-Britain, that in all cafes of this nature, the dependance is mutual, and that in fuch contefts, the *poorefl* flate always fuffers the moft; yet I fhall leave this point to the good fenfe of my readers, and confider them as operating only on Great-Britain.

First then, we are to carry on the war, and to diffrefs our enemy

" If we look back to the two laft years of our revolutionary war, a judgment may be formed on this point. A firking defect in her naval arrangements in preceding years, left our ports open for the entry of conmerce, for the equipment of privateers, and the introduction of prizes. A different arrangement in the latter part of the war, totally changed the fecne. The fmall privateers were hauled up as unable to cope with armed merchantmen, and the larger privateers were taken. Our flipping fell at the fame time a factifice to the vigilant operations of the British navy. " At the prefent noment (1795) her naval power is extended beyond al! former examples ; while that of her contax is at leaft not increafed.

"2dly. Our landed as well as commercial interefts would fuffer beyond all calculation. Agriculture above the fupply of our own wants, would be fufpended, or its *produce perish on our bands*. The value of our lands and every fpecies of domeftick property would fink.

<sup>16</sup> 3dly. The fources of revenue failing, publick credit would be deftroyed, and multitudes of citizens involved in ruin. The *people at large* would be plunged from the fummit of profperity into an abyls of ruin, too fudden and too fevere to be patiently borne. To increase their calamities, *direc*aver must be levied to fupport the war; and it would be happy for na if we could contemplate only *fireign* war, in which all might write?

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