

*Supply*

**Hon. Allan B. McKinnon (Victoria):** Mr. Speaker, I would like to express my appreciation for the lack of hyperbole indulged in by the two previous speakers. It is quite a relief compared to some of what we have heard in committee from members of the NDP. I would also like to compliment the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacGuigan) on being here for this debate. It is a very important motion that is before the House today and I think it is fitting and proper that he participate. I appreciate the care that was taken in preparing his remarks.

We are here today, Mr. Speaker, with a motion on the Order Paper which refers to a self-styled minority report. It is with some regret that I note the adoption by the NDP of an American legislative process as if it were part of ours. There is no such thing as a minority report in our processes, for a very good reason. Canadians generally prefer committees of the House of Commons to operate on the basis of consensus. Indeed, throughout our deliberations on this matter, the committee promised time after time to enable a report to be rendered which would reflect the recommendations of the majority, while leaving room for the expression of opinions of those who did not agree with the consensus. This spirit of co-operation and compromise was to prove unfruitful, I regret to say. I suppose it was an even more bitter pill for the chairman of the committee, the hon. member for Saint-Denis (Mr. Prud'homme), to swallow. Six of the 30 members of the committee, having had full expression of their views and opinions, at the end decided to issue a press release which claimed to be some kind of a minority report, whatever that is.

● (1610)

I feel a useful purpose has been served by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. It has been beneficial for Parliament and for the country to be involved in what is one of the most important matters being discussed in the world today.

In the time available to me today I should like to review the work done by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on this referral, to note some of the evidence provided by witnesses, and to report some of the recommendations made by the committee. I want to cover some of the history of the last 37 years since the first nuclear weapons were detonated; and, finally, I should like to look at some of the recommendations of the so-called minority report.

The House gave a reference to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on December 18, 1981, which read:

ORDERED—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be empowered to examine security and disarmament issues with specific attention to Canada's participation in the second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament scheduled for June/July 1982, and report to the House not later than Friday, April 2nd, 1982;—

This led to a meeting of the Standing Committee and its steering committee, at which time we discussed how much time we had, how much evidence we should hear and who should appear. As a result two letters were sent to the chairman of the committee. One was from the hon. member for

New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) who offered the names of 24 suggested witnesses, of which 10 were accepted. It was a very interesting list, and I am glad for the imagination the hon. member used inviting some of these people. I will mention Mr. Arbatov a bit later; he was one of the people included in the hon. member's list. I regret that his fellow worker in Moscow, General Mikal Milstein, was unable to attend. It added considerably to the excitement at committee.

I suggested 12 members, generally from universities and some retired military people who have taken up work with various Canadian institutes of strategic studies, etc. Of that 12, seven were accepted or managed to attend the meetings. I appreciate very much the work which was done by the committee staff in finding several others who were able to participate.

Due to the short time available, we were somewhat hamstrung. Many organizations on their own asked permission to appear, but due to the shortage of time not all could be accepted. The committee set an unenviable record for sitting frequently and for long hours. We started on February 3 and submitted the final report on April 8, having heard evidence by then from 56 witnesses and briefs and letters from 106 other organizations and individuals.

The evidence represented extremely divergent views. No one opposed arms control itself—the differences were in the methods favoured to bring it about. The key points seemed to be those dealing with verification of arms reduction and on-site inspections. Our first witness was Ambassador Menzies, Canada's ambassador for disarmament, who pointed out some of the difficulties facing the world. Before the committee he said:

A major cause of instability today is the strain in East-West relations, which has resulted in an erosion of that climate of confidence defined as "détente" in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed by 35 heads of state or of government in Helsinki in 1975, of which Canada was a member. The Soviet arms build-up, the invasion of Afghanistan, the failure of the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty, and the excesses of martial law in Poland have all been contributory factors.

He was referring to contributory factors to the instability in the world today. He continued:

A significant source of instability lies in the irregularity of the cycle of armaments modernization in the major military powers.

A later witness, Dr. G. R. Lindsey, the chief of operational research and analysis in the Department of National Defence, gave us a very professional view of the stabilizing and destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons. He said:

In judging an armaments plan or an arms-control proposal, careful attention should be paid to the influence it will have on both crisis and arms-control stability. It is not by any means an automatic conclusion that more of some weapons would be destabilizing. In general, weapons-enhancing capabilities for a counterforce first strike are destabilizing, while those invulnerable to a first strike are stabilizing.

In general, one could say that adding to an inferior force or reducing a superior force tends to be stabilizing, but the types and functions of the weapons need to be examined. My message to this committee is that the best test of a proposal for arms control is to see whether it is stabilizing or destabilizing.

Dr. Lindsey also gave us an estimate on nuclear costs. We have heard quite a bit of talk about the tremendous cost of the