

The third point is that the concern about rogue states, so much at the heart of the arguments in favour of the RMA, and the consequent worry and asymmetric WMD responses, may wane. After all, there really are only a handful of states in this position. As seems evident in the case of Iran, efforts are being made by Washington and other governments to keep open lines of engagement. There is even some movement with regard to relations between North and South Korea. If this is the case, then any detrimental impact of the RMA on arms control efforts may well be moderated and the prospects for arms control under existing regimes and methods improved. As the lessons of the Cold War indicate, the efficacy of arms control depends on political factors. An international security environment in which rogue states become less of a preoccupation for the United States and its allies, and confrontation is moderated by a lowering of threat perceptions, is one more amenable to arms control.

Fourthly, while it may not be possible to implement measures specifically directed at controlling the spread of the new technologies associated with the RMA, there is much that is readily observable. This is especially the case with regard to changes in military organization and doctrine which might accompany the new technologies. But even in the case of the weapons themselves there is a great deal of information in the open sources. Combined with the kind of surveillance that goes on continuously, it is possible for the international community to monitor the RMA, even if it is unable to create a regime to control it.

Finally the RMA will not be regarded as entirely morally neutral. As noted above, the destructive power of some of these weapons, in particular their ability to strike at the civilian infrastructures of states, will continue to impose a measure of caution on the part of the United States in how it applies unmatched military power. That Americans may well be in favour of measures to reduce their own casualties, does not mean that they impose no limits on the amount of death and destruction their armed forces can inflict, especially in cases where vital interests are not at stake. In an era of a globalized media, the "roar" of the victim mice subjected to RMA attacks may arouse sympathy in the international community.

This leads to the conclusion that although the RMA has already had an impact on the international security environment and complicated arms control, there is no reason to abandon it and good grounds to continue current efforts. It is, to be sure, easy to be cynical about arms control in the face of the evolving technologies of warfare heralded by the RMA. Cynicism, though, is not always the same as realism. Indeed it would be unrealistic to conclude that because the RMA has introduced new complications into multilateral arms control efforts that its adverse affects are so pervasive that any effort to mitigate them will be fruitless. Arms control and the methods put in place to verify it have always had to keep pace with technological advances in weaponry. Despite the inability to achieve major reductions in nuclear weapons until the end of the Cold War, real progress was made on arms control and verification with regard to other WMDs.

The future international security environment is likely to be one where *both* the RMA and arms control will present competing, but not always mutually exclusive, claims for the enhancement of international strategic and political stability. In this situation, the best that can be done is to