

is to verify'. That is just the problem. In the first phase of control, and apparently in the second, the Soviet proposals seem to conceive of control as a process of checking up on the correctness of information submitted by governments rather than of actively investigating, anywhere at any time and by any means, whether the information submitted to the control authorities is not only correct but complete. For us, control is more than verification.

"A control organ to be effective must have authority to go wherever it wishes not in order to pry into the economic activities of any country but because it must make sure that, to use Mr. Vishinsky's own example, a button factory is not secretly making lethal weapons which have not been reported to the control organ. As Mr. Vishinsky said, button factories can make things to kill people, and it is essential that the control authority be empowered to make a check, at any time on any plant where weapons could be manufactured.

CONTROL ORGAN

"This is not economic espionage but it does involve a good deal more authority for the international control organ than mere verification of data submitted. I think it is in the interests of reaching agreement that this point should be clearly stated. This is the kind of question to which a simple 'yes' or 'no' answer can be given. I hope Mr. Vishinsky will give it.

"There is another aspect of the control problem which may be raised by the new Soviet proposals. It is proposed to take December 31, 1953, as the date fixing the levels of forces from which the reductions are to be made. This date was also suggested in the Anglo-French proposals. But I think we should be clear that this would not mean the exclusion from the disarmament programme, as understood by either side, of new weapons developed since that time.

"The question of the extent of the permanent control organ's powers is also raised in an acute form by the well-known Soviet reservation which Mr. Vishinsky mentioned earlier in his statement of September 30, that states must adhere to the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. If inspection on a continuing basis means permanent inspection with the right to go anywhere at any time in the territory of all states who have signed the agreement, that is all to the good.

"We have yet to hear, however, from any Soviet spokesman, that this is what they mean by inspection on a continuing basis. If the Soviet Union's Government has not modified its doctrine of total national sovereignty and adapted it at least partially to meet the exigencies of an interdependent world, agree-

ment on effective safeguards - and therefore on a disarmament treaty - is virtually inconceivable.

"I have tried to state some of the difficulties still inherent in the control problem and to state them frankly because I believe with Mr. Lloyd that this is the crux of our problem. When the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals are considered in greater detail, I think we shall find that if agreement on control can be achieved the other aspects of the problem will fall into place. I would, however, agree with Mr. Vishinsky when he said that there was no insuperable contradiction between the two positions.

ADEQUATE MACHINERY

"The creation of adequate and authoritative machinery for inspection and control of disarmament is not any more disturbing to Soviet interests than to the interests of any other country. The Governments of the Western Powers have proposed only what they themselves are prepared to accept in their own countries. Mistrust is not the exclusive property of one or the other side of the Iron Curtain. A prerequisite of any disarmament system is certainly that no state should have cause to fear that its security would be endangered by the operation of the control system or by any other feature of the programme.

"If we are to have serious and informal examination of the Anglo-French and the Soviet proposals and all other proposals which have been or may be submitted, then I think we must all agree that upon the conclusion of the disarmament debate in the First Committee there should be an early opportunity for the further examination of the problem by a smaller group. For the reasons I have given earlier in my statement, my Delegation believe that the most appropriate group for this purpose would be the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee where the Anglo-French proposals, now accepted by the USSR as a basis, were presented.

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LESS ON IMPLEMENTS: With farm cash income down 3%, Canadian farmers last year spent about 5% less on new implements and equipment and slightly more on repair parts than in 1952. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics reported October 13 that the wholesale value of farm implement and equipment sales fell to \$238,050,354 in 1953 from \$250,277,241 in the preceding year, while sales of repair parts rose to \$31,818,818 from \$31,231,946.

On the basis of an average reported mark-up of 22.8%, the Bureau estimates the retail value of farm implement and equipment sales at \$292,326,000 last year as compared with an estimated \$307,000,000 in 1952 when the average reported mark-up was 22.6%.