

## ENDNOTES - TOWARDS RESPONSE-ORIENTED EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS\*

\* This paper incorporates material from an earlier draft presented at the CIDCM, University of Maryland Workshop on Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, College Park, 14-16 November 1996. The views expressed in this paper do not represent the official views or policies of the Government of Canada.

1. This was one of the primary points of common understanding at consultations held by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) with the Canadian nongovernmental peacebuilding community, 7 February 1997, Ottawa. These consultations, which discussed both preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding policy, were part of an ongoing enabling process for the new Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. Background briefs and concept papers may be downloaded from < [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca) >, or obtained from the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Ottawa.

2. See in particular Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, *Early Warning and Conflict Management*, Vol. 2 of *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide. Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: DANIDA/Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996). The authors argue that "Early warning was less critical in the Rwanda crisis than the willingness and ability to respond. Nevertheless, the failure to respond adequately was in part influenced by the failure to collect and analyze the data that was available and to translate this information into strategic plans. Information and analysis is critical, not only in assisting in anticipating a crisis, but in determining the appropriate response in a particular situation" (80).

3. For further discussion on this issue, see the Canadian chapter on "Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding," in *DAC Policy Orientations for Development Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Recovery* (Paris: OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, 1997 forthcoming), the final report of the OECD-DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation. See also S. Bassey Ibok and William G. Nhara, eds., *OAU Early Warning System on Conflict Situations in Africa* (Addis Ababa: OAU Conflict Management Division, 1996). This does not, of course, sufficiently address the problem that in several crisis-prone regions, such as South Asia, the regional organisation in question is either too weak or non-existent. Where present, it may only have a social and economic mandate, or where political, only inter-state issues may be addressed in the context of regional security.

4. This point was argued in the Netherlands 1996 draft paper for the OECD-DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, "Early Warning and Encouraging Coordinated Action on Analyses of Violent Conflict Potentials" (Working Group I - Topic Area IV). A revised and abbreviated version of this paper appears as part of the chapter "Sources of Violent Conflict: The Scope for Early Warning and Preventive Assistance" in *DAC Policy Orientations*, op.cit..

5. UN Secretariat staff from various relevant departments held a series of meetings as an early warning working group in the early 1990s, and concluded that what was important