

## Executive Summary

1. This study provides a comparative assessment of existing nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) in Southeast Asia, Africa, the South Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. It also presents information on proposed NWFZs in South Asia, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Six factors have contributed to an intensification in the pursuit of regional NWFZs:
  - (1) the end of the Cold War;
  - (2) the settlement of long-standing regional conflicts;
  - (3) positive developments in global nuclear non-proliferation efforts, particularly the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
  - (4) the rise of global environmental consciousness;
  - (5) the search by regional organizations for a new role in peace and security in the post-Cold War era; and
  - (6) the "demonstration effect" of NWFZs created during the Cold War period.
3. In terms of the basic obligations they impose on their members, the NWFZs are similar in many respects to each other. These similarities include a ban on manufacturing, possession, development, testing (with the exception of the Latin American zone, which allows peaceful nuclear explosions), and export of nuclear materials (except under a comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system). It is noteworthy in that the newer NWFZs appear to have made a conscious attempt not only to emulate, but also to move in some new directions. Thus, the African zone contains a number of innovations, such as a ban on research on nuclear explosives, and provisions against attack on nuclear installations. The Southeast Asia Treaty pays specific attention to nuclear accidents. The geographic coverage of the Southeast Asian zone is especially noteworthy, since it is unique in covering continental shelves and exclusive economic zones.
4. All NWFZs rely on a mix of IAEA safeguards and regional control mechanisms. While using the IAEA system allows countries to take advantage of the IAEA's considerable experience in this area, as well as to save costs, the IAEA system does not cover all verification functions required by NWFZs. The IAEA safeguards system is geared to ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states do not divert nuclear material to build nuclear explosives. It does not monitor other possible violations of a NWFZ, such as clandestine import of nuclear weapons by a party, or the use of territory within the zone by an extra-regional country for the manufacturing or testing of nuclear weapons. Such violations may be monitored by regional mechanisms. Parties to NWFZ agreements are required to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the IAEA on all sources of fissionable material within their territories, allowing the IAEA to carry out routine, *ad hoc* and special inspections of safeguarded nuclear facilities and materials. It is noteworthy, however, that despite the additional verification tasks created by NWFZs, the IAEA does not seem to have yet