

euphoria in the Council in early 1991. The Council's activity redoubled in intensity, scope and vision, and several ambitious new peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were launched, including those in Cambodia and Somalia. This era of euphoria crashed to an end in October 1993, when the death of eighteen U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu undermined American willingness to risk military casualties in the service of the UN. One week later, in response to orchestrated demonstrations on shore by supporters of the illegitimate Haitian regime, the Harlan County, carrying 200 U.S. and Canadian peacekeepers, to Haiti, withdrew from Port au Prince harbour rather than risk any such casualties, confirmed this shift in American sentiment and in the international environment.

These and other setbacks have led to a more cautious Security Council sceptical of its ability to impose its will and decisions and mindful of the UN's current dire financial straits. Too much should perhaps not be read into the Council's mood-swings. Successful Cambodian elections in mid-1993 crowned the UN's sizeable involvement in that country; similarly, its operation in Mozambique ended in 1994 with peaceful elections.³ Where conditions for UN peacekeeping seem promising, member states will in all likelihood respond to the Security Council's call for peacekeeping personnel and equipment. UNAVEM III in Angola and UNMIH in Haiti, both launched in 1995 were oversubscribed, as was the UN's new mission in Eastern Slavonia, UNTAES. Future operations are possible in such countries as Guatemala where settlement to civil strife is in sight. Some form of UN or regional preventive action is clearly desirable in Burundi, as the Secretary General has repeatedly pointed out, although the Council has been reluctant to commit to any specific course of action there, perhaps as a result of its recent experiences in Rwanda. In sum, UN and UN-mandated peace operations neither began with Desert Storm nor ended in Mogadishu.

It is important to distinguish between the various forms of peacekeeping. "Traditional peacekeeping" aims to soothe relations between belligerent states while negotiated settlements are pursued. When the contenders are happy to be separated, as on the Golan Heights, it is generally successful. However, when they continue to wish to tangle across UN lines, as in Southern Lebanon, it is extremely difficult for the UN to carry out its mission. The virtues of traditional peacekeeping should not be exaggerated: it always involved some risk and was not always successful.

"New generation" peacekeeping involves more than the simple interposition between belligerent states. It often seeks to assist societies in reconstructing themselves in the wake of civil or inter-communal strife, through a variety of techniques reinforcing public confidence in the ability of shattered State institutions to resume their functions effectively. The UN has been moving toward the 'new generation' model for some time: for example, the operation in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989-90), long a battlefield of local and regional actors with super-power sponsors, had very broad responsibilities and powers.

³ Events in Rwanda in mid-1994, involving first the radical down-sizing and then the reinforcement of UNAMIR, suggest that the Council can not indefinitely ignore some major humanitarian catastrophes, even where it clearly would prefer to do so.