

Preface

A significantly changed international environment has emerged with the end of the Cold War as well as the events in the aftermath of the Gulf War. This new environment has important consequences for thinking about the controlling of armaments and about verification. Among these changes are the following:

- 1) a heightened concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons technology, as well as excessive and destabilizing build-ups of conventional weapons;
- 2) a growing recognition that the resolution of regional and local conflicts, including intrastate hostilities, will be critical to progress in achieving wider international peace and security in the future; and
- 3) an emerging consensus that the role of multilateral processes and institutions for peace and security, particularly the United Nations, must and can be enhanced.

As represented by two seminal reports by the United Nations Secretary-General—*An Agenda for Peace* and *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*¹—the process of controlling arms and its concomitant verification dimension, are increasingly seen in the broader context of their contribution to international peace and security.

Greater international attention is now focusing on compliance monitoring activities in a variety of contexts that go beyond the traditional focus on verifying formal “arms control” treaties. These contexts include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons; reciprocated unilateral measures of disarmament; enforced disarmament or arms limitation under Security Council resolutions; and efforts to regulate military forces as part of specific conflict management activities such as peacekeeping, peacemaking

and peace enforcement. Within these contexts—which collectively might be termed the “control of arms”—there is a shared focus on:

- 1) measures to regulate armaments or military forces in some manner;
- 2) a requirement for increased transparency regarding these forces; and
- 3) a requirement that compliance with such measures be monitored, to enhance confidence and to detect violations should they occur.

While writers in the past have examined the changing roles of arms control verification, confidence-building and peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period, they have viewed the three as independent processes, or at the most have looked at the linkage between arms control verification and confidence-building. It is clear that all three processes have a basic underlying objective—increased transparency—and that in the current dangerous and unstable world, they are undergoing changed demands that bring them in closer relationship to each other.

This report results from the third in a series of forward-looking studies involving a combined team of American and Canadian scholars² and represents an important example of co-operative research. It is being made available to researchers and specialists in the field in fulfilment of one of the objectives of Canada’s Verification Research Program, which is to contribute to improved understanding of questions relating to verification in all its aspects.

¹ *An Agenda for Peace*, UN document no. A/47/277, June 17, 1992; and *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, UN document no. A/C.1/47/7, October 23, 1992.

² See Sidney Graybeal, George Lindsey, James Macintosh and Patricia McFate, *Verification to the Year 2000*, Arms Control Verification Study No. 4 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991); and Patricia McFate, Sidney Graybeal, George Lindsey and D. Marc Kilgour, *Constraining Proliferation: The Contribution of Verification Synergies*, Arms Control Verification Study No. 5 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993).