

7. On a responsive basis and with the explicit consent of parties to an arms control and disarmament agreement or negotiation, assistance in the development of additional verification provisions and procedures for an existing agreement and potential involvement in the formulation and implementation of verification arrangements for a proposed agreement.

How these "information clearing-house" and "assistance and expertise" functions could be organized remains to be considered carefully. For example, would these functions be centrally located within the Department of Disarmament Affairs or dispersed throughout several parts of the United Nations? Existing structures, organizations and resources within the United Nations should be used to the maximum extent possible to undertake these functions, in view of the serious restrictions existing at present on United Nations finances. New machinery or resources are not necessarily needed, but rather a fresh look at priorities. Member States could also be asked to contribute actively to the United Nations, for example, by making information and assistance available without cost.

The foregoing functions involve a role for the United Nations in verification that is responsive to the actual needs of parties to specific negotiations and to specific agreements. The main focus of this advisory and service function of the United Nations would be to provide assistance to national negotiators and executors of arms control agreements. It might also be appropriate for the United Nations in this capacity to provide assistance to institutional actors involved in arms control negotiations, such as the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament.

What must be avoided is to have the United Nations impose itself in the field of verification or on member states, whether in bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements. The United Nations should be able to assist, on request, and to supply services in terms of information as well as, to a limited extent, manpower and machinery. In this way, the United Nations, in its best tradition of stimulating international cooperation, could develop relevant and pertinent services needed for verifying existing arms control agreements. Furthermore, its present role in the organization of review conferences, could be enhanced by better coordination and use of expertise. In short, the United Nations could provide a data and service base.