

Is the notion of using a multilateral verification or monitoring organization an ethnocentric artifact of Western thinking? Would it have the same meaning (and effectiveness) in other political cultures? Could this potential ethnocentric design bias or undermine efforts to develop regional and global verification or monitoring organizations? What could be done to "universalize" the idea and the approach?

Should arms control and confidence-building agreements be designed from the beginning to incorporate multilateral verification approaches and techniques? How would this make a difference compared with an accord that initially assumed non-multilateral verification approaches? To what extent are arms control agreements influenced by the verification regimes that might be attached to them?

What are the implications for an alliance such as NATO in the development of a multilateral verification or monitoring organization within the CSCE framework? Can NATO play a constructive role within a CSCE monitoring organization? If an effort was made, could this type of participation be turned to the advantage of a constructively evolving NATO? Must the creation of CSCE organizations necessarily mean a diminishment of NATO's importance?

How does NATO in its present form deal with the determination of the arms control compliance of other states? Does an effective mechanism currently exist within the NATO organization for monitoring and compliance judgements? What are the lessons to be drawn from the NATO experience for the future design of multilateral monitoring and verification organizations?

How will the development of a European Community-specific security consciousness affect the development of the CSCE, NATO and the WEU? How will it affect the participation of various NATO states in CSCE-mandated arms control and its verification in a multilateral context?

Would all state groupings (e.g., NATO, WEU, European Community, Warsaw Treaty Organization) be similarly affected by the development of regional multilateral verification organizations? Might there be differential impacts? Would this have negative implications for the general security relations of a region?

Could the development of a multilateral verification organization create new opportunities for formal and informal security-related groupings? Would this promote or retard the integration of the larger community participating in the various agreements serviced by the multilateral organization? Should this be a design consideration in the thinking associated with the creation of a multilateral verification organization?

### Conceptual Issues

Is the quality of contemporary thinking about verification sufficiently sophisticated and comprehensive to permit the design of genuinely successful verification regimes? Does contemporary thinking adequately recognize that verification is not a singular activity, but is instead a process composed of a number of discrete activities including the collection of information, its analysis and the making of judgements about compliance? Does it recognize that these stages have distinctive psychological and technical aspects? Is this view of verification as a multi-stage process a useful way of understanding the phenomenon? Does its adoption yield conclusions different from those flowing from the use of simpler models? How would the failure to appreciate this process view affect verification designs?

Should analysts attempt to sharpen their language and be more precise about the distinct stages or aspects of "the verification process"? Here, the principal concern is to note and then explore a wide range of implications associated with the major distinction separating monitoring — which is hypothetically limited to "looking" —

