
shaping up in negotiations). In general, he criticized the current focus on technical and quantitative approaches to verification and advocated more discussion of political and qualitative aspects.

The IAEA Safeguards Experience

In the first session, James F. Keeley of the University of Calgary presented a summary of his paper "IAEA Safeguards. Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention."* Dr. Keeley highlighted the differences and the similarities between the verification regime and procedures of the IAEA and any verification regime for chemical weapons.

In the second session, David Fischer, former Assistant Director General of External Relations at the IAEA, discussed the objectives (including historical changes), structure and process of the IAEA safeguards. He stressed the role of the IAEA safeguards as a confidence-building measure, rather than a policing or deterrence measure and said that the nature of the political structure of any chemical weapons verification organization will be the most important structural problem. In addition, the individual and collective co-operation of states party to a chemical weapons agreement are essential to ensure sufficient resources and support for effective verification.

In the third session, Adolf von Baeckmann, Advisor, Director of Safeguards, highlighted certain problems within the IAEA inspectorate organization and identified potential problems for a chemical weapons inspectorate. These included the crucial role of the Deputy Director General; the desirability of having a rolling roster of experts for use in an inspectorate; the larger (and more complex) task of chemical weapons inspection; the difficulties in transporting samples around the world and of setting up analytical laboratories.

The fourth session focussed on operational considerations in the IAEA experience. Professor Lawrence Scheinman of Cornell University presented a paper which dealt with the issues of surveillance, confidentiality of information and the problems of anomalies in inspection results. He concluded with the observation that the IAEA mixes co-operative and independent (with its attendant adversarial) aspects of verification and noted the problems that chemical weapons verification might present in these areas.

In the fifth session, Benjamin Sanders, a private consultant with the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, concentrated on practical issues associated with the legal basis for verification agreements; the human (or, personnel) aspects of inspections; and the management of a verification

* Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers, No. 1 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1988).