

INTRODUCTION

A central and enduring feature of contemporary international relations is the “adversarial partnership” between the United States and the Soviet Union.* Thrown into a situation of bipolar confrontation after World War II, these two states have developed and deployed military capabilities on a scale unparalleled in history. They are superpowers, with respect to both their global military presence and their destructive nuclear capabilities.

Their postures as nuclear adversaries did not cause the Cold War which emerged between them in the early post-1945 period, but those postures have over the past forty years exacerbated and heightened Soviet-American distrust. Yet, in the matter of their mutual interest in security and survival these two states have, during the past two decades or so, also groped their way toward a more stable military relationship. Arms control has been a chief instrument of this quest, promising quantitative and qualitative restraints on military/technological

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