

couched to take effect when an East-West limitations agreement comes into force.

Finally, NATO has yet to respond to Warsaw Pact appeals for mutual discussion of military doctrines. NATO could seize an initiative here by tabling a formal proposal that such discussions take place among the thirty-five at regular intervals. NATO would have to accept that some of its doctrines like nuclear deterrence and nuclear first use would come under attack: they most certainly would, but this is already the case in other fora like the UN General Assembly and review conferences of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, those doctrines can be and are attacked anyway in a European context in the periodic CSCE review conferences.

In sum, with a little skill and imagination, delegations from NATO countries ought to be able to conduct themselves well in what will be an unusually complex negotiating environments in both the CST and the CCSBMDE. It is, admittedly, too easy in papers such as this to be glib about NATO positions that ought to be adopted, when in real life it is extraordinarily difficult for the sixteen to reach common positions on issues of arms control. It may be that NATO will enter both negotiations embracing few if any of the ideas discussed here. Should that have to be the case, these thoughts might be helpful a little later.

In the longer run, one hesitates to be naively sanguine in appraising the prospects for a successful CST, but MBFR foundered on the two core issues of the data dispute and verification. If CST can leave data to be dealt with in the CCSBMDE and build upon Stockholm for verification, then negotiators can at least focus their energies on key issues that remained beyond the reach of MBFR, like force structures, when discussing reductions and limitations. In the CCSBMDE