With UNFICYP's presence deterring major military operations, an uneasy truce prevailed between the communities. The initial three-month duration was extended, eventually by six-month periods. In the search for security and protection from communal violence. populations tended to congregate into enclaves. As the minority community, Turkish enclaves tended to be the norm. These varied in size from the major enclave, encompassing the area from the Kyrenia Pass to northern Nicosia, to a few houses in smaller villages. As communal fighting escalated, enclaves increasingly were protected by defensive fortifications. These were in turn paralleled by encircling fortifications which had the effect of besieging and further isolating enclaves. UNFICYP made little progress in the actual dismantling of these fortifications although in some areas local forces were persuaded to leave them unoccupied.

Nevertheless, from 1964 to 1967, UNFICYP was able to facilitate a restoration of government services and utilities and a degree of normalization of economic life. This included escorts for movements of food, merchandise and civilian traffic, harvesting and land maintenance arrangements, water and electrical utility service and basic government services such as social security and postal service. In the absence of a political settlement, these achievements generally had to be negotiated on an *ad hoc* basis with the *de facto* local authority.

From 1964 to 1974, UNFICYP was not capable of completely preventing crisis situations from arising, or of taking action to disarm military forces on the island. UNFICYP was, however, capable of limiting the consequence of crisis. Thus the likelihood of major Turkish intervention or the overrunning of isolated Turkish enclaves by the Greek Cypriot forces was reduced. This stabilizing presence and a return to a degree of normalcy resulted in the military strength of UNFICYP being reduced to 2,200 by 1974.

## **COUP AND INTERVENTION**

By the spring of 1974, it appeared that a political settlement in Cyprus might be possible. The intercommunal talks, progressing slowly since 1968, had produced a package deal which balanced a degree of Turkish community autonomy with modifications to some of the separate status provisions of the 1960 constitution. Acceptance of these provisions would confirm an independent Cyprus without *enosis* with Greece. External factors and pro-*enosis* elements were to ensure that this proposed settlement package could not be implemented.

Clandestine pro-enosis activities increased in the summer of 1972. At the same time, the military leaders in Greece were considering direct intervention in Cyprus as a dramatic event to restore public support. The Cypriot National Guard under its Greek officers staged a coup on 15 July 1974 but failed to kill President Makarios who escaped from the island to rally international support.

On 20 July, Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus, claiming the unilateral rights of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as justification. The regime established by the coup collapsed and the government of Cyprus resumed authority under the Speaker of the House, Glafcos Clerides. At the same time, the military dictatorship in Athens also collapsed. Meanwhile Turkish forces quickly occupied Kyrenia and moved south to link up with the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia.

UNFICYP was in a difficult position. Its structure, strength and equipment were designed to control intercommunal violence, rather than to intervene in large-scale military operations. From 20 to 25 July, UNFICYP used its freedom of movement to promote the safety of the civilian population. This involved protection of isolated communities and the evacuation of foreign missions from Nicosia to the British Sovereign Base at Dhekelia. Nicosia Airport, which had been the scene of heavy fighting, was occupied and designated a United Nations Protected Area.

The Security Council authorized the Force to carry out duties relating to the maintenance of the cease-fire which had gradually been enforced by 24 July. UNFICYP's strength was increased to just over 4,440 by 14 August. Meanwhile from 25 to 30 July, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey, meeting in Geneva, reached agreement to establish a security zone around the bridgehead to reduce confrontation.

Negotiations to define the security zone and other elements of the cease-fire broke down on 14 August and the Turkish army undertook military operations to expand its bridgehead. United Nations personnel again attempted to preserve the cease-fire and protect civilian populations. Partial cease-fires were established in Nicosia on 15 August and a general cease-fire achieved on 16 August 1974. By this time the Turkish army controlled the northern 40 percent of Cyprus.

## THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION 1974-86

The historical and political problems which had frustrated an effective constitutional arrangement from 1960 to 1974 were now complicated by the factors of armed occupation, refugees, property loss, missing persons and *de facto* partition. The trauma of the events of 1974, did however force a degree of communal cooperation to resolve the most pressing humanitarian concerns. Informal meetings in Cyprus led to a series of Intercommunal Talks in Vienna and New York in 1975 and 1976.

One of the chief results was the agreement to effect a transfer of populations to permit a consolidation of communities. It was variously seen as a temporary measure to reduce potential conflict and to allow a cooling off period. Whatever the original intent, the communal transfers, combined with the refugee dislocations of 1974, created a situation in Cyprus unique since the arrival of the Turks in 1571. The island was now effectively