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- 2. The destruction of chemical weapons stocks shall start for all States Parties possessing chemical weapons simultaneously. The whole destruction stage shall be divided into nine annual periods.
- 3. Each State Party shall destroy not less than one ninth of its stockpile [in measure of stockpile equivalent and/or equivalent mustard weight] during each destruction period. 1/2/ However, a State Party is not precluded from destroying its stocks at a faster pace. Each State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each destruction period, as specified in part III of this Annex and shall report annually on the implementation of each destruction period. 3/
- 4. Order of Destruction (to be elaborated). 4/5/

Taking account of existing discrepancies in CW stocks it suggests a specific phased approach, according to which State parties with large CW stocks are to proceed with the destruction of their stockpile until an agreed level is reached in the first phase. In their view, it is only after the end of this first phase, which would result at the end of the fifth year in the levelling out of the large CW stockpiles, that State parties with smaller stockpiles would be required to start with the destruction of their stocks. The whole two phased destruction period would be subject to close monitoring.

<sup>1/</sup> It is considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical weapons stocks. The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remains unresolved and is subject to further consideration.

 $<sup>\</sup>underline{2}/$  Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the regulation of the destruction of stockpiles needs further and full discussion.

<sup>3</sup>/ It has been recognized that the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and the elimination of relevant production facilities should be considered together.

<sup>4</sup>/ Some delegations feel that it would be appropriate to introduce the idea of security stockpile levels to meet the security concerns of countries with small stockpiles of chemical weapons.

<sup>5/</sup> Some delegations drew attention to the proposal contained in CD/822 of 29 March 1988. This proposal is aimed at ensuring the undiminished security of all States during the destruction stage. To this end, it proceeds from the basic undertaking that all CW production shall cease immediately upon entry into force of the Convention and that all chemical weapons storage sites as well as production facilities will be subject from the outset to systematic international on-site verification.