

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese has been doing a useful job. A valuable set of ideas and proposals has been accumulated and a rather good basis has been laid for concrete, businesslike and goal-oriented work. To this end, working papers have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament by, for example, Italy (CD/9), the Soviet Union (CD/274 and CD/476), Canada (CD/678 and CD/716), Pakistan (CD/708) and Venezuela (CD/709/Rev.1). Item 3 of the Committee's work programme, entitled "Proposals and future initiatives on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", should really be used to conduct discussions and, later on, negotiations on appropriate measures.

In the course of the debate, various delegations have addressed the question of what a treaty banning ASAT weapons should look like and how the immunity of satellites could be ensured in a legally-binding manner. At the plenary session on 24 July 1986, my delegation described the principal elements which it felt ought to form part of a future treaty. Today, I intend to develop a number of ideas which concern the scope of a future accord, verification of compliance, and the relationship between a ban on ASAT systems and the peaceful use of outer space. In so doing, I will take into account suggestions and proposals put forward by various other delegations.

Even though the Committee has not been able so far to agree on the objects to be protected in outer space, it seems to us that a common denominator is emerging on what the envisaged treaty should cover. The assumption to proceed from, in this context, is that there are no weapons in outer space and that, consequently, all objects in space must be protected. Given this assumption, it should be within the scope of the treaty to:

- (a) ban the use of force against any space object;
- (b) prevent the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects;
- (c) prohibit interference with the normal functioning of any space object;
- (d) proscribe the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons;
- and (e) provide for the destruction under international control of any ASAT weapons that may already exist.

It ought to be possible on this basis to meet the concerns expressed by a number of delegations, which have said that it would be difficult to distinguish between dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities. "Rules of the road" or a "code of conduct" could find their place under the type of scope I have outlined just now. It goes without saying that all these things require in-depth study.

Ensuring compliance is undoubtedly one of the most crucial and thorniest problems. Various options would be conceivable individually or in combination: (a) broadening of information exchanges on trajectory parameters and functions of space objects; (b) use of national technical means of verification; (c) creation of a multilateral consultative mechanism complementary to other forms of consultation; (d) establishment of an international inspectorate provided with far-reaching powers, including the right to conduct stringent on-site challenge inspections. The details of these measures and methods need to be worked out.