

was not, in his opinion, such as would justify, on that account, the rejection of the treaty. They would, in substance, be the same, and have differed but little, probably, in the expense of execution.— Either was better than the other alternatives—to do nothing; to leave things in the dangerous state they stood; or to yield to the right of search or visitation.

It is objected that the arrangement entered into is virtually an acknowledgment of the right of search. He did not so regard it. On the contrary, he considered it, under all the circumstances—as a surrender of that claim on the part of Great Britain; a conclusion, which a review of the whole transaction, in his opinion, would justify. Lord Palmerston, in the first place, claimed the unqualified right of search, in which it is understood he was backed by the five great powers. Lord Aberdeen, with more wisdom and moderation, explained it to mean the right of visitation simply; and, finally, the negotiation is closed without reference to either, simply with a stipulation between the parties to keep up for five years a squadron of not less than eighty guns on the coast of Africa, to enforce separately and respectively the laws and obligations of each of the countries for the suppression of the slave-trade. It is carefully worded, to make it mutual, but at the same time separate and independent; each looking to the execution of its own laws and obligations, and carefully excluding the supervision of either over the other, and thereby directly rebutting the object of search or visitation.

The other article, in reference to the same subject, stipulates that the parties will unite in all becoming representation and remonstrance, with any powers, within whose dominions markets are permitted for imported African slaves. If he were to permit his feelings to govern him exclusively, he would object to this more strongly than any other provision in the treaty,—not that he was opposed to the object or the policy of closing the market to imported negroes, on the contrary, he thought it both right and expedient in every view. Brazil and the Spanish colonies were the only markets, he believed, still remaining open, and to which this provision would apply. They were already abundantly supplied with slaves, and he had no doubt that sound policy on their part required that their markets should be finally and effectually closed. He would go farther, and say that it was our interest they should be. It would free us from the necessity of keeping cruisers on the African coast, to prevent the illegal and fraudulent use of our flag, or for any other purpose but to protect our commerce in that quarter—a thing of itself much to be desired. We would have a still stronger interest, if we were governed by selfish considerations. We are rivals in the production of several articles, and more especially the greatest of all, the agricultural staples—cotton. Next to our own country, Brazil possesses the greatest advantages for its production, and is already a large grower of the article; towards the production of which, the continuance of the market for imported slaves from Africa would contribute much. But he would not permit such considerations to influence him in voting on the treaty. He had no objection to see Brazil develop her resources to the full; but he did believe that higher considerations, connected with her safety, and that of the Spanish colonies, made it their interest that their market should be closed against the traffic.

But it may be asked, why, with these impressions, should he have any objection to this provision of the treaty? It was, because he was averse to interfering with other powers, when it could be avoided. It extends even to cases like the present, where there was a common interest in reference to the subject of advice or remonstrance; but it would be carrying his aversion to fastidiousness, were he to permit it to overrule his vote in the adjustment of questions of such magnitude as are involved on the present occasion.

But the treaty is opposed, not only for what it contains, but also for what it does not; and, among other objections of the kind, because it has no provision in reference to the case of the Creole, and other similar ones. He admitted that it is an objection; and that it was very desirable that the treaty should have guarded, by specific and efficient provisions, against the recurrence of such outrages on the rights of our citizens, and indignity to our honor and independence. If any one has a right to speak warmly on this subject, he was the individual; but he could not forget that the question for us to decide is, Shall we ratify or reject the treaty? It is not whether all has been done which it was desirable should be done, but whether we shall confirm or reject what has actually been done; not whether we have gained all we could desire, but whether we shall retain what we have gained. To decide that as it ought to be, it is our duty to weigh, calmly and fairly, the reasons for and against the ratification, and to decide in favor of the side which preponderates.

It does not follow that nothing has been done in relation to the cases under consideration, because the treaty contains no provisions in reference to them. The fact is otherwise. Much, very much, has been done;—in his opinion, little short, in its effect, of a positive stipulation by the treaty to guard against the recurrence of such cases hereafter. To understand how much has been done, and what has been gained by us, it is necessary to have a correct conception of the state of the case in reference to them, before the negotiation commenced, and since it terminated.

These cases are not of recent origin. The first of the kind was that of the brig Comet, which was stranded on the false keys of the Bahamas, as far back as 1830, with slaves on board. She was taken into Nassau, New Providence, by the wreckers, and the slaves liberated by the colonial authorities.—The next was the Encomium, which occurred in 1834, and which, in all the material circumstances, was every way similar to that of the Comet. The case of the Enterprise followed. It took place in 1835, and differed in no material circumstance from the others, as was acknowledged by the British Government, except that it occurred after the act of Parliament abolishing slavery in the colonies had gone into operation, and the others prior to that period.

After a long correspondence of nearly ten years, the British Government agreed to pay for the slaves on board of the two first, on the ground that they were liberated before the act abolishing slavery had gone into operation; but refused to pay for those belonging to the Enterprise, because they were liberated after it had. To justify this distinction, Lord Palmerston had to assume the ground, virtually, that the law of nations was opposed to slavery—an assumption

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