## QVEEN'S QVARTERLY

come. In this mood Lee carried on the war, and that was one cause of his military failure. After all was over, he said: "I believe I may say, looking into my heart, and speaking in the presence of God, that I have never known one moment of bitterness or resentment." To the South he counselled "silence and patience". It was not until Gettysburg that he permitted himself to refer to the Federals as "the enemy"; up to that time they were always "those people". Not all officers were so reticent. In the Cuban war of 1897, at Las Guásimas, when the Spaniards broke from their trenches, Fighting Joe Wheeler reverted to the more general Confederate mood as he exclaimed "We've got the damn Yankees on the run."

Lee was too gentle; he did not enforce that inner discipline upon his subordinates, compelling obedience to his orders by which alone his calculated tactics could succeed. His verbal instructions were at times forgotten or garbled in transmission; his written orders, not always clear, were frequently neglected. To Pender at Chancellorsville he was obliged to say, "I tell you what to do but you don't do it." His cavalry was always out of hand. J. E. B. Stuart, that picturesque young officer not yet thirty years old, entered joyfully into a plan for a reconnaissance in the rear of McClellan's army. With $\mathbf{1 , 2 0 0}$ picked troopers he rode off "as happily as if starting on a honeymoon". Disregarding the orders written by Lee's own hand he conceived the idea of riding completely around the Federal army. In two days he found himself on the wrong side of a river, and was calling upon Lee for help. At Gettysburg Lee was without his cavalry. "I cannot think what has become of Stuart," he said; "I am in ignorance of what we have in front of us." For six momentous days Stuart with 9,000 cavalry was away upon a wild exploit and only returned when the battle was at its height, his horses and men utterly worn out. Yet to the end Lee retained his admiration and affection for Stuart.

