

*External Affairs*

the United States, even though we might have no commitments in regard to it which would put us under any obligation for participation, except that which would flow out of our United Nations membership.

That is also one of the reasons we have to keep in the closest possible touch with Washington, as well as with London and New Delhi and other friendly capitals, on all these matters, and more particularly on these Formosan matters. I have personally more than once made known our views, our serious doubts and anxieties to the secretary of state on this matter and have received from him a full statement of the United States position and the reason it has been adopted. He has confirmed the view, which I have already expressed, that there is no aggressive purpose of any kind behind that United States position.

It seems to me that the first requirement at the moment for the avoidance of conflict is for both Chinese sides to refrain from using force, particularly—this is the immediate danger point—against or from the coastal islands, but also against or from Formosa. We can certainly agree, I think, with Mr. Dulles when he said in New York in that speech which I have already mentioned:

We do not expect the Chinese communists to renounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their efforts to realize their goals by force?

If the Chinese communists have a case in this matter, then there are ways and means by which civilized countries can attempt peacefully to settle these disputes, both inside and outside the United Nations. An effort has already been launched in the security council to bring about a cease-fire as a preliminary to a political settlement based on reason and justice. The response to this initiative by the Peking regime was a summary refusal, but the council has shown great restraint in order to keep the door open for a peaceful solution whenever this can be obtained.

For the moment, however, I think there is a greater chance of finding a solution by direct diplomatic negotiation, which is presently going on, than by the use of the security council or even by calling a conference outside the United Nations. The main difficulty in the first case, a meeting of the security council, arises over the fact that the Chinese communist government is not a member of the United Nations and now refuses to participate in a United Nations meeting at which China is represented by the Chinese nationalist government. The main difficulty in the

second case, a conference outside the United Nations, is, I think, that it would be premature at this juncture, even if it were possible to get the two Chinese governments into the same room.

Although efforts that have been made have not yet resulted in any solution, we do not need to despair or abandon these efforts, which as I have said are taking place through diplomatic channels. What has been accomplished has revealed indications on the communist side of at least a desire to avoid all-out war.

In the age of the hydrogen bomb a readiness to negotiate may be inspired not by love but by fear. Whatever may be the cause, there is some reason to hope that all the parties concerned may at least be looking for a solution which they could dare to accept. If this is the case, then it would be great folly to miss any opportunity for negotiation which might present itself; even worse folly to destroy all such peaceful possibility by falling back again on the use of force. If a settlement could be reached over this most acute of all recent disputes, the free world might conceivably find itself in a position from which it could proceed, even if slowly, laboriously and fitfully, to establish a framework of peace and political stability in the Far East. The search for that peace and stability may require strong defences, but no solution will be found merely by putting a sterile reliance exclusively on those defences. That is one reason why I should say a few words, Mr. Speaker, about the disarmament discussion which is taking place in London at the present time, and concerning which some questions have been asked in this house.

As hon. members know, there is a subcommittee of five powers, and Canada is one of them, now meeting in London to discuss the limitation of armaments that are now ironically called both conventional and atomic weapons. That subcommittee of five is meeting again after having met last spring as a result of a United Nations assembly resolution last fall with which my hon. friend the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin) had a great deal to do. That meeting in London is taking place in the awful shadow of the hydrogen bomb, which should be incentive enough for achievement. Hon. members will recall that last spring four-power proposals were put forward for limitation of armaments, atomic and conventional, by stages, with effective and complete control and inspection at every stage.

I cannot say much about what is going on in London because those meetings are being