

but there should continue to be a number of part-time members sufficient to provide a broad cross-section of Canadian opinion. The authority of the Board will reside in the full-time members, but there will be an obligation to consult the whole Board before decisions are taken on matters of regulatory policy.

It is accordingly proposed that the Board shall comprise a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and three other full-time members, together with up to seven part-time members, all to be appointed by the Governor in Council. Normal terms of appointment will be seven years for the full-time members and five years for the part-time members, but in both cases the terms of initial appointments will be adjusted so as to ensure a rotation of new appointments.

The Committee concurs with the White Paper's proposal that the Board of Broadcast Governors be reconstituted and its powers and authority clarified so as to make it a more effective regulatory authority in all matters affecting general broadcasting policy. We emphasize our conviction, however, that the areas of authority and responsibility of the BBG and the CBC, and the nature of the relationship it is intended to establish between them, be fully understood and clearly defined in the legislation.

If public and private components are part of a single structure, as the Fowler Committee Report and the White Paper see them to be, a common regulatory authority is needed to oversee this structure and, as an "auditor general" of broadcasting, to advise Parliament periodically as to the performance of Canadian broadcasting.

*Although the ultimate authority and responsibility of Parliament is clear, it is equally clear that Parliament cannot administer or supervise broadcasting. Nor do we believe a Minister of the Crown should have such power. A reconstituted BBG should provide an assessment of our broadcasting system. In order to do so, it must have clear-cut directives from Parliament as to how it will be expected to act on Parliament's behalf.*

The CBC, as the prime instrument of public policy in broadcasting and one of the world's largest broadcasting organizations, needs a strong Board of Directors. Its directors would continue to be challenged with the management of one of our country's most important corporations. Legally, they are the Corporation. Although they hold this public asset as trustees for the Canadian people, it is natural that they should develop loyalties to its personnel, its programs and its welfare. It is in the public interest, as well as in the interest of the CBC, that they do so, within the context of their responsibility to Parliament on behalf of the people. At the same time, the CBC (and the public) should benefit from continuous and co-operative liaison with a BBG bearing responsibility for overseeing performance of the entire broadcasting system. The BBG, however, should not be involved in the Corporation's day-to-day decision-making or in policy-making concerned with the internal workings of the Corporation. These must be the responsibility of the CBC Board of Directors.

The responsibility of the BBG, in the first instance, would be to amplify the broad principles for Canadian broadcasting laid down by Parliament and to set general standards following public hearings. The legislation must say,