

*Russia and the Newly Independent States*

Perhaps the most significant **traditional** security problem in the Euro-Atlantic area is the issue of integrating the Russian Federation into a pan-European structure of co-operative security. Russia remains significantly alienated by the substance and course of NATO enlargement. The NATO-Russia Final Act has mitigated this alienation to some extent, but hardly completely. Further enlargement, particularly if it embraces former Soviet republics (e.g. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) will reinforce this alienating effect. NATO actions in Kosovo - and notably the Russian view that NATO may have circumvented UN Security Council and UN Charter provisions concerning the use of force by regional associations (Chapter VIII)<sup>29</sup> and the fact that such use was a response to the internal policies of a member state (bringing Article 2, para.7 into play) - have further complicated the relationship between Russia and its European and transatlantic partners.

Underlying these specific issues is a more general problem: NATO was founded as a collective defence mechanism directed at the Soviet Union. Although its counterpart (the Warsaw Treaty Organization - WTO) has disappeared, and although NATO has made significant efforts to redesign itself for the post-Cold War European security environment, the mission of collective defence remains at the core of the role that NATO defines for itself.<sup>30</sup> It is legitimate to ask: collective defence against what? In the OSCE space, there is one answer - Russia.

The Atlantic security community has not managed to discover a way to achieve the full integration of Russia into a broader architecture of co-operative security in Europe. Despite the effort to paper over the impact of NATO enlargement, Russian foreign policy and defence elites continue to display considerable consensus that this process is at odds with Russia's national interest. Elite opinion in Russia seems to range from the visceral hostility to NATO characteristic of the nationalist/communist right to the more nuanced criticisms of liberals.<sup>31</sup> The latter argue that, for NATO to play a positive role in European security, it needs to transform itself from an essentially collective defence organization to a co-operative security mode as part of an authoritative pan-European structure.

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<sup>29</sup> Article 53 of the Charter notes that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." Although NATO is not a "Chapter VIII" regional organization (as the OSCE is), NATO clearly is in common language a "regional arrangement." No such authorization was forthcoming. Two exceptions are mentioned in the Article, both pertaining to the response to actions taken by states that were World War II enemies of signatories of the Charter. Article 51 of the Charter (Chapter VII) notes that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations ..." No such armed attack occurred.

<sup>30</sup> See "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NAC S(99)65, 24 April, 1999, paragraph 10.

<sup>31</sup> Polling data suggest the depth of Russia's alienation from NATO. A recent poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Institute found that nobody in Russia trusted NATO completely, 5.7% trusted it to a certain degree, 15.7% did not trust it very much, and 59% did not trust it at all. "Most Russians Do Not Trust International Organizations, Including EU, UN, NATO," *BBC Monitoring*, 13 April, 2000. It is depressing, if unsurprising, that no data are reported on the OSCE.