

proposals and demands were: (a) an end to underground nuclear testing beginning with a moratorium on testing, (b) a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals, (c) a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the treaty, and (d) substantial aid to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several of the non-nuclear countries allied to the United States or the Soviet Union were sympathetic to the proposals of the non-aligned countries and a fragile consensus was achieved on a Declaration, in which the nuclear powers in effect promised to try harder to meet the demands of the non-nuclear countries. In agreeing to the consensus Declaration, the non-aligned countries made an "interpretative statement" that was attached to the Declaration, saying that they stood by their political proposals and that they interpreted the Declaration in the light of those proposals. Thus the consensus Declaration was subject to serious reservations by the largest grouping of states.

The Second Review Conference in 1980 was attended by 75 of the then 115 parties to the NPT. At the time of its convening, none of the demands of the non-aligned countries had been fully met and they were particularly displeased by the failure of the nuclear powers to live up to their obligation to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The non-aligned states were ready to reach agreement on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided for in Article IV of the NPT, and on safeguards, in accordance with Article III. In order to facilitate the assured supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, they were willing to explore plans to establish regional nuclear fuel cycle centres that would undertake to provide many of the services required for peaceful nuclear programs. These included an international fuel bank to stockpile natural and enriched uranium and fuel rods; a regime for international plutonium to deal with reprocessing of spent fuel and storage of the plutonium produced; the management of spent fuel, including its storage, and that of highly radioactive wastes. They also favoured full-scope international safeguards by the IAEA over all nuclear materials, plants and activities in all non-nuclear countries. An agreed consensus was readily attainable on all these matters.

However, no consensus was achieved on halting and reversing the nuclear arms race as provided for in the Preamble and Article VI of the treaty. The nuclear powers would make no concessions on nuclear arms control measures, not even on the early setting up of a working group in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. As a result, no

over-all agreement could be reached and the conference ended in failure without any final declaration or even any formal re-affirmation of support for the NPT.

THE 1985 REVIEW CONFERENCE

By the time of the Third Review Conference in 1985, the outlook for the NPT was gloomier than before. The international situation had deteriorated in the intervening five years and the nuclear arms race was proceeding at the fastest pace ever. Far from the nuclear states living up to their obligations under Article VI "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," negotiations for several measures of nuclear arms control had either been suspended or were stalemated and, for the first time, there had been no agreement on any measure of nuclear disarmament in the preceding five years. The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom for a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been suspended in 1980, and the United States refused to resume them or agree to begin multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament where all five nuclear powers were participants. Global military expenditures had escalated to some 1,000 billion dollars a year to the detriment of world economic and development prospects, and there was the looming threat of a new, incalculable, destabilizing and exorbitantly costly arms race in both defensive and offensive weapons in outer space.

Recognizing that the NPT might face some serious problems at the Third Review Conference, the US, UK, USSR and their allies had made efforts during the preceding year to urge more countries to accede to the treaty and to persuade all non-nuclear powers to soften their positions and to exercise moderation in their demands on the nuclear powers. They stressed that the treaty was essential for the security of the non-nuclear states as well as of the nuclear states and that, by making demands on the nuclear states that were unlikely to be fulfilled, they might undermine the effectiveness of the treaty.

On the other hand, several non-aligned countries urged all other non-aligned parties to arrange to participate in the conference (which was not easy for a number of the smaller countries who found it a burden to provide the necessary personnel and funds), in order to be able to exert as much pressure as possible on the nuclear powers in the hope that they might soften their resistance to the demands of the non-nuclear states.