

THE MORNING CLOUD AND EARLY DEW.

The blazing, burning sun
Shone hotly on my tender summer flowers,
Their little life was but begun,
They needed soft, refreshing showers
To nurse the germs of life so newly formed,
To woo the tiny leaf to stretch and spread,
To teach the thread-like roots within the ground
To cling more firmly to their lowly bed.

Sally I watched the much-tried leaves
Shrink from the scorching beams above,
And opening buds, that drooped, as one who
grieves
At hardness in the object of its love.

I rose up in the dawning grey,
And quested of the coming day,
Oh! will your hours bring the bright showers
To bless my pretty suffering flowers?
And lo! a gathering cloud which drew
My eager longing gaze;
Larger and nearer still it grew
As though my hopes to raise.
Hail now, I said, my much-loved flowers
That pine for rain,
Soon shall the gentle showers
Raise your bright heads again,
But when again the warm sun's one,
The cloud of promise soon was gone,
It fled before the scorching ray,
And vanished from the sight away,
And many a lovely opening flower,
A priceless floral gem,
That would have smiled beneath the shower,
Hung withered on its stem.

And is it thus, my God, with me?
Do clouds of hope and promise rise,
Which in the hour of trial flee
As mists that melt in morning skies:
These thoughts which now the warm heart crowd,
These longings for the good and true;
Oh! are they fleeting as the cloud
As transient as the early dew?
My life might be as summer showers
That glad the parched and thirsty ground;
And gracious acts, Faith's fairest flowers,
Might strew my daily steps around.

Saviour! forbid, that in that day
When I shall meet Thee face to face,
When earthly treasures pass away,
I should have naught to take their place,
Naught but these dreams which mock me now,
Visions of what I might have done;
No living laurels on my brow,
But shades of what I might have won.
No golden harvests gathered here
To swell the triumphs of Thy cross;
Naught but the refuse of the year,
Earth's empty fame or golden dross.

MARIE.

Another Warning Voice from 1805.

By MAJOR-GENERAL T. B. COLLINSON, R.E.
1793-1801.

(Continued from Page 276.)

Fortifications and Guns.

The fortifications of the south and east parts of England were in a wretched condition for a country to go to war with. The fortifications enclosing Portsmouth existed and those enclosing Portsea were completed or nearly so; and Blockhouse Fort, Southsea Castle, and some coast batteries in Stokes Bay. At Dover the Castle, the citadel on the western heights, and some sea batteries existed. At Chatham one or two of the small forts on the lines only existed. At Sheer's Garrison Point was fortified, and on the Thames, Tilbury Fort and two or three batteries below it were all the defences. On the coast between these places and up north to Yarmouth, there were batteries which had been constructed since 1793; but these and the whole of the other works had been partly dismantled during the short lived peace of 1802. As to the rest of the coast of Great Britain in 1803, there was not a general from the north of Scotland down to Land's End who did not write to represent the defenceless state of his district.

Mr. Pitt, in 1804 (when he returned to office) like Lord Palmerston, in 1859, gave a new start to the fortifications of the country. About that period were commenced at Portsmouth the Gosport Lines, the Hilsen

Lines, Fort Monckton and Fort Constantine. At Dover the lines on the western heights were constructed as field works. At Chatham also the lines were made as field works, and one or two of the detached forts commenced. And the lines at Sheerness. Along the coast between Portsmouth and Yarmouth, those extensive series of Martello towers and coast batteries now existing were begun. At Plymouth, the lines round the dockyard were made as field works, and field redoubts constructed on the neighbouring sea heights; the citadel, and some of the sea batteries existed before.

But not many of these works were ready to resist the attack if it had been made in 1805; indeed, the towers on the east coast were not begun till 1808; and the deficiency of guns was loudly complained of. The inadequate ideas on this subject might be judged from the total number of guns on guns (from 42 to 60 pounders) in fortresses and batteries between Sheerness and Deal, including Dover, in 1803, being 3,000 and with only 30 rounds per gun of ammunition. Napoleon having 500 garrison guns at Boulogne alone. Also that the Commander-in-Chief in 1803 calculated on having 480 held guns available for the defence of the whole of Great Britain, with 150 rounds per gun; Napoleon having 400 ready to embark in his flotilla, besides some 2,000 pieces belonging to the vessels themselves. As to the reserve of small arm ammunition in the fortresses and fixed camps was at that time 60 rounds ahead for about 230,000 men. Lord Chatham (Master General of the Ordnance in 1803) ingeniously remarks that he could supply the guns, but the difficulty was to get gunners, officers, and horses, and seems to think it a satisfactory explanation to say that "goodwill and numbers will not supply the qualities necessary in artillery," it would have been rather more so if that undisputed truth had been taken into account in 1790. And to the Commander-in-Chief's reiterated representations of the want of proper fortifications for the arsenals and dockyards, he returns the regular answer, which has been handed down among other parts of the old machine, "it has been referred to a committee." One can fancy the committee sitting steadily through the crisis, and making a most valuable report when it was all over. As to the intrenchments for strengthening the various positions between the coast and the capital, selected for making a stand at, except the two camps now existing at Colchester and Shorncliffe, and a position at Chulmsford, I cannot find that anything was done at all; except, indeed, a brisk correspondence as to whether it was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief or the Master General of the Ordnance to make them.

We are now in a better condition regards the defence of our naval arsenals, thanks to Lord Palmerston; but the line, especially that 'vulnerable line' and the mercantile harbours are not much better on the whole now than they were then; the batteries and guns for the most part are almost as obsolete as if of 1805 still remained. On the east coast particularly, that coast which was directly threatened by Napoleon's Texel expedition, and opposite which a possibly new one has sprung up since his day, the tower batteries of 1805 are still the main defence, and as regards the guns of the present are almost as they were left in 1812. member the two morals on this subject from England and the other from France—"The period of the enemy's greatest weakness is that of his landing;" and

"les balimens Anglais furent contraints de tenir le large—par l'effet des pieces de fort calibre."

The Defence of London.

The project for defending London included Highgate on the north, and Sydenham and Woolwich on the south, and had a circuit of 46 miles—a large scheme for that day. But when we learn that 170,000 men were considered as the necessary garrison, that the greater part of them were to be furnished by London itself and that the outrenchments were to be made in a few days, after the landing of the enemy, one begins to doubt whether it was seriously intended to carry out such a project, which would hardly have delayed the capture of the capital for a day. That was all however, the Commander-in-Chief could hope to do,—to put as much obstruction as possible in the direct way of the enemy—between him and the great prize he sought. And this must be the principal of all projects of defence of the Kingdom: so that on whatever point of the coast an enemy may land, it will be certain that he will have to fight his way through a succession of obstacles up to London, the last and greatest of all being close to the capital itself. Mr. Pitt saw that. In discussing the defence in Parliament at this time, he said: "It is in vain to say you should not fortify London because your ancestors did not. If, by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety or the destruction of the capital. It will not make the difference between the conquest and the independence of this country; for that will not depend upon one nor upon ten battles: but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives and millions of property, and of confounding the efforts and causing failure in the enterprise of the enemy." Napoleon saw it, for on the map I have mentioned before, there is an entrenched camp marked on the north side of London, from which he intended to defend his prize; and long after, at St. Helena, in discussing the general question of fortifying capitals, he said: "A great capital is the country of the flower of the nation; it is the centre of opinion, the general depot; it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a point of such importance without means of immediate defence." And he enumerates the rapid conquests he made of Austria, Prussia, and Spain, owing mainly to the defenceless state of their capitals at the time; and the loss of his own kingdom, in 1814, from the same cause; to which we may now add, its protracted defence in 1870, in consequence of the deliberate adoption of his advice in time of profound peace.

Other Preparations.

Several other points of great importance in the defence of the country are discussed in the Commander-in-Chief's correspondence. The removal of the inhabitants from the coast, and the removal or destruction of live and dead stock, is a very serious question: though full regulations were laid down at the time about it, on the whole it was left to be carried out too much at the last moment. Some steps towards it ought to be taken always on declaration of war. Napoleon trusted much to capturing a large number of horses in England.

The accumulation of provisions at the central points of assembly of the forces, though much considered, was not sufficiently provided for, judging by the reports of some generals; too much dependence was apparently placed on local resources, especially