

Each of these is essential to our conception of a Person. Not that they go to constitute personality as if that were made up of parts, but that each is an essential, and often a simultaneous manifestation, of the one personality. Among these, the Sensibility is central. It is the source of all feeling. In this, hope and fear, joy and sorrow, desire and affection have their roots. Without it there can be no motive, and so, no action of the Will.

The Sensibility being thus central, I observe respecting it that it is the condition of moral ideas. By this I mean that it is only in connection with the action of a sensibility that a moral nature can act, or moral ideas be originated. How is it that we have the notion of a right which I suppose to be the primitive moral idea? Only as we have some desire or active principle. But active principles have their root in the Sensibility. Without the idea of a good, as actual or possible for some one, there could be no idea of obligation, or of justice, or of moral love. That love which is the fulfilling of the law, and in which the choice of good for some one is central, could not exist.

But if the moral nature cannot act without a Sensibility, does not that imply that it is secondary and subordinate to the Sensibility? So some suppose. They think the view now presented detracts from the exalted nature of the Moral Faculty and the independence which they conceive belongs to it. But it no more detracts from the exalted nature of the Moral Faculty to say that it is conditioned on a sensibility than it detracts from the exalted nature of a king to say that the idea of him is conditioned on that of subjects. The moral faculty is king; but, if there were no active principles having their root in the sensibility, there would be nothing over which it could rule. This dependence of the moral nature and of the ideas which it gives on a sensibility has not had the place in moral discussions to which it is entitled.

Again, if moral ideas are conditioned on a sensibility, it will follow that the sphere of moral action is limited by that. An action that does not produce, and is not intended to produce, any result in some sensibility is not a moral action.

Is, then, the motive to action drawn from the Sensibility, or from the Moral Nature? This has been and is the point of perplexity. The way out of it is to state the part which each has in the action as originating or controlling it. Without the Sensibility we should not act at all. All agree that the Will acts only through the Sensibility. As has been said, the central act of moral love is choice, an act of the will. But if the Will is moved only through the Sensibility, the motive for its action must be from that. If we are to love God we must see in Him that which is worthy of love, which calls forth admiration, approbation, adoration; that which fits Him to be our portion and all-sufficient good, each of which can be only through a