

Sharp, that economic development is likely to be disruptive. A clearer indication of the élite addiction to the status quo may be seen in its emphatic rejection of national liberation as an objective of aid policy, and in the fact that only a narrow majority concurred that "Canada should restrict its relations with countries that make racial discrimination an official government policy". On the other hand, four-fifths rejected the proposition that "Canada should take no responsibility for helping to solve racial problems in Africa" and, asked to rank 20 international actors in terms of their impact upon the global system, the élite considered only the Palestine Liberation Organization to be more negative than South Africa.

Canada's most active Third World role has been that of peacekeeper. An overwhelming majority of the élite (94 per cent) agreed that this role should continue. Only 14 per cent concurred that "Canada should automatically volunteer troops whenever the United Nations establishes a peacekeeping operation", and many respondents volunteered that we should be more discriminating than in the past. Nevertheless, asked to evaluate the importance of ten reasons for Canada to maintain armed forces, the élite ranked peacekeeping second only to the defence of sovereignty, and well ahead of such objectives as "to help counter the Soviet military threat," or "to maintain internal security". Although the Third World has been the locale for most of the post-1945 violence, and the area where all the UN's peacekeeping has occurred, or seems likely to occur, the élite's commitment to the peacekeeping vocation seems unlikely to be mainly attributable to concern for the well-being of the developing nations. It results also from pride in a role that has brought Canada considerable distinction, and concern for global stability. The super-powers have avoided direct confrontation in the many Third World conflicts, but the possibility remains that one of these disturbances might trigger a major war that Canada could not escape, or economic dislocation that would probably injure Canada through the impact upon its major trading partners.

The élite no longer appears to believe that Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is essential, or even that UN peacekeeping in itself constitutes a major contribution to global stability. Still less does it appear to believe that Canada's response to the demands for a New International Economic Order are likely to matter very much. Hence, even when the desirability of global harmony is recog-

nized, the conviction often remains that Canada could afford to take a cheap ride in international development. That Canada fails to exercise this option, the élite appears to believe, is primarily because its foreign policy is substantially influenced by the morality and altruism of the Canadian people. These qualities, however, are perceived to be limited. Unless the élite is persuaded that Canada must respond more adequately to the demands of the Third World to escape serious material damage, it seems unlikely to alter the current policy priorities. Alternatively, it would need to be convinced that the Canadian electorate is more moral, and more determined to share with the wretched of the world, than has been assumed. There is little evidence of strong popular resistance to Canada's modest role in the Third World. There is even less, alas, of a mounting demand that Canada should do a great deal more.

The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion reported in 1975 that 72 per cent of Canadians believed that the developing countries should share in the responsibility for Third World development, and over half (53 per cent) favoured an increase in economic assistance. On the other hand, other polls have found an unwarranted degree of public satisfaction with Canada's contribution to international development, and a reluctance to make sacrifices in order to improve performance; CIPO, for example, reported in 1968 that two-thirds of the Canadian public rejected the proposal that taxes be increased as a means to assist poorer nations.

Variations

Striking variations exist within the foreign policy élite. Not surprisingly, the strongest support for doubling Canadian aid came from the senior officials of the Canadian International Development Agency whom I interviewed. This might be discounted on the ground that CIDA has a vested interest in a large development budget; but a cynic could also cite the self-serving instinct that prompted a large majority of CIDA to reject the proposition that more Canadian aid should be channelled through effective multilateral agencies. CIDA's sympathy for Third World aspirations, however, is well demonstrated by its relatively strong support for racial equality and national liberation, and the fact that it was the only sub-élite to favour the speedy removal of tariffs on imports from less-developed countries. The CIDA officials were also the most likely to insist that the need of the recipients should

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