

APPENDIX

on the north side of the river. They had that day some skirmishes with the enemy; a few being killed on both sides. They advanced some way towards the city; but the cold was now so severe, that the feet and hands of many were frozen; and others were taken sick with the Small-Pox. Besides: the enemy having seasonably learnt, a considerable time before, that they were in no danger of having any disturbance towards Montreal, our army that way having returned, drew all their strength from those parts; regular troops, Canadians and Indians; and in short made themselves much superior in the field. These were sufficient reasons for not advancing farther towards the city, in order to assault, or besiege it; and the troops were soon re-embarked. Sir William, however, in the mean time, had brought some of the ships up to bombard the city; and had his own ship shot thro' in near 100 places. A French writer, Baron LaHonton, then at Quebec, makes himself very merry with this bombardment; telling his reader, that hereby the place suffered damage to the amount of about "5 or 6 pistoles." He is also very severe on the conduct of Sir William. He says, "he could not have done less than he did, if the French had hired him to stand still with his hands in his pockets." This is doubtless an injurious reflection on him. For considering the bad weather, the cold, the sickness, the smallness of his force, the failing of the intended diversion at the westward, and the consequent strength of the enemy at Quebec, it was hardly possible to have done more than he did; tho' that was indeed but very little to the purpose.

It was Sir William's design, notwithstanding these discouragements, afterwards to have landed the troops in the face of the city, under cover of his cannon, and to have taken it by storm; the troops, as well as himself, being still full of spirit and resolution. But soon after, "a violent storm" arose that separated the fleet, and the snow and the cold "became so extreme, that they could not continue in those quarters any longer." And it was probably well for them, all circumstances being considered, that they did not attempt to put this latter design into execution; the enemy being at least 3 or 4,000, and perhaps 5 or 6,000 strong.

To say that the same number of veteran troops, under an experienced commander, and other regularly bred officers, could not have done more under the same circumstances, is much more than I presume to do. But yet it can hardly be supposed

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