

We think this display will shew, that our government are well persuaded they can fearlessly, and *without danger of peace*, (the thing they most dread) make as many offers as they please, so long as they insist on the *renunciation* of the *right*, and on the validity of our *naturalization laws* to wash away the duties of natural allegiance—duties, in which more writers on the law of nations are agreed, than in any other principles whatever.

1st. It appears from Mr. Monroe's and Mr. Pinkney's correspondence, as to the aforesaid negotiation, that Great-Britain refused to yield up her right, and it was apparent she never would yield it on any terms.

In a conference of Monroe and Pinkney with Lords Holland and Auckland, on the 22d August, 1806, these noblemen, who were very friendly to our nation, observed, "that they felt the strongest *repugnance* to a *formal renunciation* of their claim to take from our vessels on the *high seas* such seamen as should appear to be their own subjects; and they pressed upon us with much zeal, as a substitute for such abandonment, that our crews should be furnished with authentick documents of citizenship of a nature and form to be settled by treaty, which should *completely protect* those to whom they related, but that, subject to such protections, Great-Britain should continue to visit and impress as *heretofore*," (that is their own subjects.)

"They enforced this by observing that they supposed our object to be to prevent the impressment of *American seamen*, and not to withdraw *British seamen* from the service of their country, in times of *great national peril*, in order to employ them ourselves; that their proposal would effect this object, that if they should consent to make our commercial navy an *asylum* for all British seamen, the effect of such a concession upon her maritime strength, on which Great-Britain depended, might be *FATAL*."

It is evident from this extract, that even the Fox ministry, so favourable to America, *never could think of yielding the principle*. It is apparent also, that they were willing to adopt, and did offer, a very fair expedient to *remedy abuses* in the exercise of the *right*. Lastly, it seems from this extract, that Great-Britain is not so much opposed to this relinquishment on account of the number of her sailors, *now in our service*, as from her fears, that as soon as our navy shall *by treaty* become an *asylum*, no stipulations on our part can prevent its being abused to the utter destruction of her marine power.

On the 11th of Sept. our ministers write that they consider the objections of Great-Britain such as will not be surmounted.

"All our efforts, they say, proved ineffectual. The *right* was denied by the British commissioners, who asserted that of their own government to seize its subjects on board neutral merchant ships on the high seas. And who said, that the relinquishment of it at this time would go far to the *overthrow of their naval power*, on which the safety of the state *essentially* depended."

Our ministers at the same interview, in Sept. 1806, proposed as a substitute the restoration in future of all British deserters